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 Lake Baikal has been a source of life with deep spiritual meaning for the 
peoples of the region. However with the development of human communities 
around Baikal, the resources of the lake face danger of over-use. In the twentieth 
century when industrialization posed particular risks to the lake, citizens of the 
Baikal region rallied to protect their homeland. In so doing, these environmentalists 
had to work within the political system of the time. This research examines the 
ways in which environmentalists on Baikal carved out spaces for activism in the 
face of political turmoil and economic pressures. Tracing the evolution of 
environmentalism from the 1930s through the present day, this paper focuses on the 
transition from communism to capitalism from the 1980s to the 1990s. The author 
argues that this period of transition has created a space for environmentalist 
movements around Baikal within an international community; at the same time, 
these movements face real challenges due to a lack of domestic funding and 
regulation of environmental policies. The contextualization within the politics, 
economy, and culture of the times discussed in this work reveals the potential 
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Preface: Transliteration, Translation, and Citations 
 
In my research, I used both English and Russian language texts. In the case of 
literature by Valentin Rasputin, I read the texts in Russian, but used existing translations 
for direct quotations in this paper. The translation used is reflected in the citation. For all 
other Russian language texts, the translations are my own. Furthermore, I cite 
scholarship that has not yet been translated into English. In these cases, the research 
provides Anglophone readers with a sample of the information presented in these 
resources.  
However, there are some words and concepts that cannot be translated. In these 
cases, I have transliterated the word using the Library of Congress system. For example, 
заповедник, a Russian nature reserve, is transliterated as zapovednik. Names and places 
will also be transliterated in accordance with the Library of Congress transliteration 
table. An exception to my use of this system is when referring to words or names that 
are commonly spelled in a different way. For example, Бурятия is transliterated here as 
Buryatia instead of Buriatia. 
 As a final note, works are cited in the language in which they are written. For 
example, if a citation is in Russian this means that the text I am referencing is also 






Every year hundreds of thousands of travelers make the pilgrimage to the 
breathtaking shores of Baikal. From the legendary birthplace of Genghis Khan’s mother 
to the fish market of Lestvianka, it is no wonder Lake Baikal has earned the title of the 
Pearl of Siberia. Unfortunately, the awe-inspiring beauty of Baikal’s vistas may not last 
forever. Scientists are studying the effects on the environment from climate change and 
are discussing ways in which environmental degradation in the region will influence the 
thousands of local plant and animal species. These changes are in fact grave, and even if 
it were only the non-human species that experienced the impacts of climate change, it 
would be important to invest in research and protection of local ecosystems. However, 
we too are part of nature’s complex web and rely on the natural world for survival, and 
consequently are subject to the results of environmental degradation.  
 Human beings must balance the utilization and protection of natural resources in 
order to ensure that future generations continue to have the basics we need to survive, 
i.e., potable water, air, shelter, and food. The wealth of natural resources of Lake Baikal 
supplies those necessities to the peoples of the region as well as to the millions of 
species that depend on the lake for survival. The beauty and resources of Baikal have 
inspired activists, scientists, and writers to speak out in protection of the lake. 
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Commonly, we refer to these efforts to protect the natural resources of a region as 
environmentalism. In the United States movements of environmentalism have increased 
in the past forty years along with other social movements as the dangers of pollution 
have become evident. Likewise, on Baikal environmentalism has received attention in 
light of the worldwide debates on global climate change. However, environmentalism, 
even without that official title, has existed for much longer than we have known about 
the biological and chemical effects of carbon dioxide.  
On Baikal trends in environmentalism have evolved with the culture, politics, 
economics, and external pressures of the time. The shifts in environmentalism are 
particularly evident during periods of political transition. The changes in the political 
and cultural climate place new limitations on movements working to protect the natural 
resources of the lake. On the other hand, political changes can also provide more 
opportunities for environmental activism and may even lead to improved environmental 
policies (as was the case with Gorbachev’s reforms). During political turmoil new 
circumstances appear to inspire environmentalist action on Baikal. For example, the 
rapid industrialization during the 1930s and the repressive leadership of Joseph Stalin 
were detrimental to the environment because of the construction of hydroelectric dams 
on Baikal’s rivers. At the same time, the strictness of Stalin’s rule limited critique 
against the powers that be in order to defend the environment. In contrast, the 
Khrushchev period in the 1960s saw an increase in free speech, which fostered public 
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action and outspokenness on the importance of the protection of Baikal. With the 
changing politics of the twentieth century, writers, natural scientists, politicians, and 
everyday citizens in the Baikal region have carved out spaces for environmentalism 
based on the circumstances in the country. 
In the past century Russia has seen drastic transformations in governance, 
finances, and individual freedoms, the most recent change being the transition to 
capitalism and democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Environmentalism 
around Baikal during this most recent transitory period has greatly informed today’s 
policies and movements to protect Lake Baikal. At the same time, the course of 
environmentalism in the 1980s and 1990s did not stand alone and took on the 
characteristics and influences of preceding periods. Modern environmentalism has 
characteristics that demonstrate the influence of environmental politics and movements 
of the twentieth century. For this reason, in order to assess environmentalism on Baikal 
during the period of transition from communism to capitalism and in the twenty-first 
century it is important to understand the previous stages of movements to protect the 
lake.   
Using the history of social movements as a lens for analysis, this paper traces the 
development of environmental movements on Baikal from the 1930s through 2013. 
Particularly, this work focuses on the ways in which environmentalists around Siberia’s 
Sacred Sea (Baikal) have found spaces for activism over the past century and the 
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influences of one period of environmentalism on the next. We will look at questions 
related to environmentalism in transition: What economic factors inhibited 
environmental protection? How did politics influence legislation to protect Baikal? Who 
participated in environmental protection? What long-standing cultural factors impact the 
progress of nature protection movements? What incentives existed to protect natural 
resources? 
In answering these questions I draw from the work of scholars in multiple fields: 
biology, history, sociology, environmental studies, among others. In my research 
presented here, I use these diverse sources to provide a history of environmentalism on 
Baikal by bridging the gaps in the existing literature. Overall, there is substantial 
scholarship on the biological changes of the lake, the history of social and 
environmentalist movements in the former Soviet Union, and the societal changes that 
came with the collapse of the USSR. There are also scattered government and non-
governmental reports from the Baikal region and a substantive body of literary texts by 
Baikalian native Valentin Rasputin. This scholarship and literature pertaining 
specifically to Baikal is invaluable in assessing the environmental movements in the 
region. However, there is not yet a comprehensive study focusing on environmentalist 
movements in the Baikal region in the twentieth century. The historical, scientific, 




Much of the existing literature pertinent to this topic deals with scientific studies 
of the effects of climate change on the chemical makeup of the water, air temperature, 
and other physical attributes of Baikal’s ecosystems. These studies include analyses of 
the impacts of pollution from industrial activity in the region as well as the implications 
to public health from the degradation of Baikal’s natural resources. The scientific 
community in the Baikal region has both published work in the Russian language and 
also collaborated with scientists from the United States to produce English-language 
reports. These works provide substantial evidence that there have been negative 
consequences of pollution in the region both for non-human life on the lake and for 
human health. In Chapter One of this paper, I use the studies of these scientists to outline 
the reasons that protection of the lake is important.  
There is also a wealth of scholarship on the history of environmentalism in 
Russia and the former Soviet Union; however, no text exists that outlines the history of 
environmentalism particular to the Baikal region, aside from a section of a larger work 
or a reference as a case study. One of the primary environmental historians specializing 
in Russia and the former Soviet Union is Douglas Weiner. Of particular interest to 
environmentalism during the twentieth century is Weiner’s A Little Corner of Freedom. 
In this book Weiner outlines the history of environmentalist movements in the Soviet 
Union from Stalin through Gorbachev. This book includes a chapter on Baikal, which 
offers useful case studies and analysis upon which I expand using other texts and 
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resources. Although Weiner and other environmental historians do not extensively 
discuss issues pertaining to the Lake Baikal region, they do offer the necessary 
framework to contextualize movements on Baikal.  
To further contextualize civic environmental activism on Baikal, I draw from the 
work of Russian sociologists. This includes the work of Oleg Yanitsky and V. A. 
Artemov. Again, their research does not address Baikal in great depth (if at all); 
however, both provide overviews of broader socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors 
that influenced the movements to protect the lake. For example, Yanitsky analyzes 
major shifts in environmental debates in Russia. Using this framework, I fit activism on 
Baikal into national trends. On the other hand, Artemov does not address 
environmentalism at all but rather the changes in lifestyle that the people of Siberia 
experienced in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR. Using his work in conjunction 
with the scholarship of environmental historians, we can assess the ways in which the 
changes to people’s everyday lives following the fall of the Soviet Union affected Baikal 
locals’ participation in efforts to protect the lake.  
With the contextualization supported by these aforementioned works, I narrow 
the focus to the Baikal region with resources that address this region specifically. 
Distinct from the scientific studies of climate change on the lake that principally focus 
on the physical repercussions of pollution for the lake, these works deal with the 
interactions of human communities with their surrounding environment. Because of the 
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scarcity of resources that speak to issues and circumstances particular to the Baikal 
region, the texts that I include in this paper represent a variety of fields. For example, the 
main texts that I utilize include reports on development in the region, literary fiction by a 
Baikalian native, and a survey that I conducted while abroad in Irkutsk, Russia (a 
provincial capital on Baikal). First, in the 1990s consultants and local scientists on 
Baikal collaborated to produce The Lake Baikal Region in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Model of Sustainable Development or Continued Degradation? (1993). This bilingual 
(English and Russian) report examines the conditions of the Baikal watershed at a key 
moment in history, the early 1990s immediately following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and makes recommendations for the policies and citizen actions that will 
facilitate sustainable development on the lake. Second, Chapter Three analyzes the work 
and life of Valentin Rasputin, a Baikalian native who writes both fiction and nonfiction 
about the lake and the detrimental effects that industrialization had on local 
communities. Third, in the final chapter I incorporate questions from a survey that I 
performed in Irkutsk on local perceptions of the relationship between environmental 
degradation and public health in the region.  
While the results of my survey, the literature of Rasputin, and the report of 
sustainable development in the region are not exhaustive, they offer a glimpse of the 
experience of the citizens of the region and their fight to protect Baikal. Although these 
works represent distinct methodologies, their focus on Baikal allows us to place the 
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social movements of the region within the context of broader trends for 
environmentalists, the economy, and politics that the environmental historians, 
sociologists, and other scholars provided. Without incorporating a plethora of 
methodologies, i.e., by using only texts documenting case studies of environmental 
movements on Baikal, we would not be able to do a thorough analysis because of the 
dearth of resources that focus on the Baikal region. By integrating these diverse 
methodologies, my research can work to fill a gap in the scholarship regarding Baikal 
and the history of environmentalist movements to protect the lake.  
 Based on my analysis of the resources outlined above, I contextualize the 
situation of environmentalism around Baikal using information on the political, social, 
and economic changes of the period. Particularly, this paper focuses on the development 
of environmentalism during Stalin’s time in power, the Khrushchev Thaw, and finally 
the years of glasnost’ and perestroika under Gorbachev and the influences these periods 
have had on the development of modern environmentalism from the 1990s until through 
day. Ultimately, I argue that Stalin’s repressive rule left a legacy of exploitation of 
Baikal’s resources in the name of industrialization and economic development that 
pervades the government’s perspective on Baikal to this day. Following Stalin’s death, 
the years of greater freedom of expression in the country with the Khrushchev Thaw saw 
public outrage at degradation of the lake, which conflicted with the standards for 
industrialization set by Stalin. Finally, the transition leading up to and following the 
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collapse of the USSR created a space for environmentalism around Baikal within an 
international community, yet with real challenges due to a lack of domestic funding and 





Chapter One: An Overview of Baikal 
 
 
A) Early Settlement of Baikal 
 
 Throughout history the climate of a region has influenced the development 
of the local peoples and cultures. The Baikal region is no exception. In fact, because 
of the harsh winter conditions, the ancient peoples of Baikal needed particular skills 
and knowledge to find food and build homes. Central asian tribes, who were the 
first settlers of Baikal, lived in underground dug-out shelters to avoid the harsh 
winter winds and blizzards. As they discovered ways to live in harmony with the 
environment and its extremities, shamanists of the region developed a spiritual 
connection to Baikal. The tourist industry today uses artifacts of Baikal’s Shamanist 
traditions and their spiritual connection to the lake to pique visitors’ interest. For 
example, at overlooks tour guides encourage tourists to tie strips of fabric to trees. 
This practice imitates the Siberian shamanist barisaa, peace tree practice, that was 
part of their traditional belief system. Aside from these tourist attractions, the 
residents of Baikal maintain cultural identities connected with the original peoples 
of the lake. A good example is the Buryati people who are descendants of the 
Mongolian settlers. In the Republic of Buryatia, they continue to pass down tales on 
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Baikal and its environment in Russian and in the native Buryati nation. In this way, 
the heritage of the peoples of Baikal, which is closely tied to its environment, can 
influence their modern relationship to the lake. Briefly overviewing the 
development of the relationship between man and nature starting from the lake’s 
earliest inhabitants establishes the roots of modern perceptions of the environment. 
  From prehistoric times the extreme climate has greatly shaped the lifestyle 
of the peoples of the region and has arguably fostered a bond with the non-human 
environment that a more mild climate perhaps could not. The potable water, fish, 
berries, and other resources around Baikal allowed for inhabitants to survive on 
Baikal for 30,000 years.1 During the Ice Ages nomadic peoples hunted reindeer and 
mammoth despite the severe weather conditions.2  Since then, peoples of Northern 
Russia and Central Asia settled the area. Starting in the sixth century “the lower 
reaches of the Selenga River, Tunkinski valley region and the valleys of the 
Barguzin, Angara and Lena Rivers were inhabited by representatives of the Turkic 
tribe called Kurikans.”3 In the thirteenth century peoples from Mongolia settled in 
the western and eastern regions of Baikal. The descendants of those peoples are the 
modern day Buryati nation. The basis of the early people’s economies consisted of 
fishing, hunting, and gathering around Baikal and later they also bred cattle and did 
                                                
1 Brunello, Anthony J, et al. Lake Baikal: Experience and Lessons Learned Brief. N.p., 27 Feb. 2006.  
2 "First Settlers of Baikal." BWW.irk.ru: Comprehensive Data about Lake Baikal in Siberia. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 17 Apr. 2012.  "http://www.bww.irk.ru/index.html" http://www.bww.irk.ru/index.html, 1. 
3 “First Settlers of Baikal,” 2 
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blacksmith work.4 As in many primitive agricultural and hunting and gathering 
societies the peoples of Baikal had only the local resources to rely on for survival.  
 Because of their complete dependence on the raw materials from the lake, 
its tributaries, and the surrounding forests there existed a special balance between 
the earliest inhabitants of Baikal and nature. For the earliest settlers, maintaining a 
respectful and conscious relationship with Baikal was not only connected with the 
populations’ physical survival, but also with their spiritual life. Various taboos, 
prohibitions, morals and ethical norms, dating back to pagan beliefs, served as 
regulators between man and nature.5 For example, Shamanists believed that it is 
wrong to cut down a tree by a spring, trample plants, or kill more animals than 
necessary for survival.6 In the thirteenth century the great leader Genghis Khan 
banned the use of the resources of Baikal for economic purposes. He proclaimed the 
territory surrounding the Maloe More (Small Sea), a part of Baikal between the 
island Olkhon and the northwestern shore, as “The Great Forbiddance Zone.”7 This 
declaration prohibited any development in the area, including agricultural.8 Of 
course modern environmentalists would not count Genghis Khan’s proclamation as 
an early sign of their movement; however, it does contrast with today’s laws 
                                                
4 "First Settlers of Baikal,” 4. 
5 Думова, И. И., Механизмы Управления Региональным Природопользованием. Новосибирск: n.p 
2001. Print, 24. 
6 Volkov, Serguey. Around Baikal. Ed. Natalia Bencharova. Trans. Bertie Playle. Olkhon Island: Nikita's 
Homestead, n.d. Print, 102. 
7 Brunello, Anthony, Lake Baikal: Experience and Lessons Learned, 3. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
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governing environmental use. This decree also implies that in the time of Genghis 
Khan’s rule Baikal was valued independently from the its resources to be exploited 
for physical sustenance. 
 Since the time of Genghis Khan’s reign the ideology towards nature has 
changed along with the demographics, lifestyle, and economics of Baikal. In the 
seventeenth century, many Northern Russian peasants immigrated to the region. At 
first they settled alongside, but separately from the local tribes, which were also not 
yet united.9 For the most part, scholars associate Russian migration to the region 
with exploration of the Taiga, the deciduous forest that spreads across Eastern 
Siberia. The Russian settlers adopted an “integrated economy based on a 
combination of crop-growing and stock-breeding alongside hunting, fishing, 
carrier's trade and nut-gathering.”10 The extreme winter temperatures and weather 
contributed to the generally “unique condition of life... [which] left its imprint on 
[the inhabitants’] characters and mentality” and resulted in “certain features: 
steadfastness, reliability,” that have been associated with “the notion of ‘sibiriak’ (a 
Siberian),” again emphasizing the locals’ sense of identity related to the 
surrounding natural environment.10 The increased development and subsequent 
industrialization of Eastern Siberia led to a change in some of the local peoples’ 
perceptions of the relationship between man and nature. I. I. Dumova, a scholar 
                                                
9 Volkov, Seruey, Around Baikal, 3. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
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studying Baikal, has labeled these changes as the shift to “the conquest of nature” 
ideology.11  
 Thus, since the days of the early settlers, human interaction with Baikal and 
the surrounding forests and rivers has evolved with industrialization, population 
growth, immigration, and the overall development of the region. With the 
construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad starting in the nineteenth century and the 
industrialization that came with Stalin’s Five-Year plans in the early twentieth 
century, trades such as forestry increased dramatically. Lumber and coal industries 
used trains to ship raw materials all over the USSR, with little regard for the 
depletion of habitats.12 The uses of the natural resources of Baikal in modern times 
demonstrate both the “conquest of nature” philosophy as well as an awe for the 
beauty of Lake Baikal. Deforestation of the Taiga for the lumber industry continues 
to exemplify the former approach to Baikal’s resources. In contrast, the tourist 
industry depends on the preservation of the environment of Baikal in order to attract 
visitors from around the globe who want to experience the pristine beauty of the 
lake. Both the history of the use of Baikal and the modern utilization of its 
resources influence modern peoples’ perceptions of climate change and pollution of 
the environment.  
 
                                                
11 Думова, И. И., Механизмы Управления Региональным Природопользованием, 24.  
12 “First Settlers of Baikal,” 7. 
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B) Modern Baikal: Today’s Uses of the Resources of the Baikal Region 
 Today in the Baikal region we see the conquest of nature ideology in the 
industrial activity around the lake. The most developed industries in the region are 
timber and wood-processing, pulp and paper, mining, fuel, non-ferrous metallurgy, 
power engineering, machine-building, chemical and oil, food and ferrous metallurgy.13 
The Irkutsk Oblast, a province on Baikal, boasts 15% of timber export, 6% of coal 
mining, nearly 20% of pulp production, and about 9% of oil processing in Russia.13 
Tourism is also a prominent source of income in cities and towns on Lake Baikal, such 
as the town of Lestvianka and Olkhon Island. That fact that hundreds of thousands of 
domestic tourists come to the shores of Baikal to relax and enjoy the scenic views 
reflects the reverence for the beauty of Baikal that the first inhabitants harbored. As is 
common with tourist sites, towns on Baikal use the cultures and eccentricities of the first 
residents of the region to draw in domestic and international visitors. For example, one 
can find tributes to the ancient shamanist belief systems with strips of fabric tied onto 
trees at popular vistas around the lake.  
 These industries influence environmentalism. Tourism incentivizes preservation 
of the natural beauty of the region. In order to ensure the purity of the sites, the tourist 
industry works to protect the environment. In fact, concentrations in ecotourism are 
growing in popularity as undergraduate and graduate programs expand at Irkutsk State 
                                                
13 "Irkutsk Oblast, Russia (Irkutskaya)." Welcome to Russia. RussiaTrek, Jan. 2012. Web. 24 Apr. 2012. 
"http://russiatrek.org/irkutsk-oblast," 1. 
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University.14 On the other hand, the lumber industry causes considerable deforestation in 
the area. Similarly, the Trans-Siberian railroad that transports raw materials, including 
lumber, throughout Russia alters the shape of the cliffs as workers have to drill into and 
explode the sides of rock walls to create tunnels for the trains.  
 
C) Environmental Degradation on Lake Baikal  
 In the 1990s concern for the health of Baikal and the surrounding territories led 
to studies of the effects of human exploitation of the lake. Research by ecologists, 
climatologists, biologists, scholars in the health science fields, and others have emerged 
that address the environmental degradation that has occurred in the region. While these 
studies do not constitute environmentalist activity independently, their findings serve as 
rallying points for organizations looking to protect the environment. Put simply, without 
evidence of environmental degradation there is no purpose for environmental 
organizations. With that in mind, understanding the effects of pollution and the changes 
to the natural world is paramount for analyzing environmentalism in the oblasts (roughly 
equivalent to a province or state) surrounding Baikal.  
 A cooperative study done between biologists from the United States and Irkutsk 
State University, titled "Climate Change and the World's “Sacred Sea”—Lake Baikal, 
Siberia,” provides a comprehensive report on the biological changes to the lake. Baikal 
                                                
14 Руденко, Г.B., and Е.B. Бирюкова. "Экологическое  Образование и Туризм в Байкальском  
Регионе." Инетеллектуальные и Материальные  Ресурсы Сибири: Материалы Региональной  
научно–практической конференции. Иркутск: Издательство БГУЭП, 2007. N. pag. Print, 44. 
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lies adjacent to the Central Siberian Plateau, “one of three areas in the world 
experiencing the most rapid climate change.”15 As reported in the article, scientists have 
already found evidence of climate change in the region including a 1.2 degree Celsius 
increase in average yearly air temperature and a 2 degree Celsius increase during the 
winter season.16 Additionally, scientists have reported an increase in chemicals in the 
lake.17 Looking at the biological and chemical changes scientists have noticed over the 
years, environmental scholars have made projections on the continued changes to the 
regional climate.18 Of course, no one can know for certain what further changes to the 
environment, if any, will come in the future. Simply, evidence of the changes that have 
already occurred supports predictions that current environmental degradation could lead 
to significant impacts on the everyday lives of peoples who work and live in the Baikal 
region. For example, studies have shown connections between environmental 
degradation and public health, which could serve as incentives to become involved with 
environmental movements.  
 
                                                
15 Moore, Marianne V, et al. "Climate Change and the World's “Sacred Sea”—Lake Baikal, Siberia " 
BioScience 59.5 (2009): 405-417. 
http://www.bioone.org.ezproxy.macalester.edu/doi/full/10.1525/bio.2009.59.5.8, 2.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 3.  
18 Ibid.  
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D) Factors Affecting Public Health 
 Studies of the Baikal region have found that there are serious links between “the 
worsening condition of the environment and the health of the population of the 
region.”19 There are various threats to human health from decreased air quality, water 
pollution, and other consequences of industrial activity, e.g., chemical spills. Respiratory 
conditions, such as asthma, caused by poor air quality can influence one’s opportunities 
for work, especially if available jobs involve physical labor. If enough people are 
affected, either from their own illness or from the suffering of a loved one, then the 
health of the entire society will decrease. A threat to health on a societal level could 
motivate politicians to enact policies to protect the environment and public health. For 
example, following the catastrophic Chernobyl explosion, Gorbachev prioritized the 
regulation of nuclear activity. Health interests also have the potential to drive 
movements to protect the pristine quality of the natural resources of Baikal.   
  As previously mentioned, Baikal has some of the most rapid climate change 
globally.20 This is reflected in the ranks of Siberian cities with the highest risk to 
physical health due to environmental degradation. I. I. Dumova divides Siberian cities 
into four levels of risk groups based on the amount of pollution and the prevalence of 
conditions associated with this pollution: (1) extremely high ecological danger,  (2) high 
ecological danger (3) moderate ecological danger, and (4) undetectable ecological 
                                                
19 Тюмасева, З.И., Маркова А.С., Машкова И.В. “Здоровье человека и окружающей среды–в 
аспекте общего эколого–валеологического образования студентов педагогических вузов,” 38. 
20 Moore, Marianne V, et al. "Climate Change and the World's “Sacred Sea”—Lake Baikal, Siberia," 3. 
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danger. Two cities on Baikal, Angarsk and Bratsk, fall into the first group: extremely 
high ecological danger. The second group of cities, those with high ecological danger to 
health, includes the most well known and largest Baikalian city, Irkutsk, as well as 
Chita, a medium sized town. Finally, in the moderate risk group is Baikalsk, the factory 
town that gained fame due to the closing and reopening of its out-dated paper mill.21 
Notably, the cities with the greatest tendency for illness are industrial towns such as 
Irkutsk. Supporting this, a study in Buryatia found that the worst health conditions tend 
to occur in towns with the greatest levels of industrialization. In the Kamensk Kabanskii 
region, for example, there are six large industrial enterprises. In that region studies have 
found 1.5 to 2 times higher incidence of respiratory and digestive illness, malignancy of 
neoplasm, and other conditions than in the less industrial regions.22  
 The report Protection of Lake Baikal and Environmental Management in the 
Baikal Region claims that the association “between the levels of technological pollution 
of the atmosphere and illness of the population” is a close one.23 The connection 
between industrial activity and risk of illness supports theories that pollution has a 
significant connection to public health. The Baikalsk case study illustrates interaction 
between public health and environmentalism. Baikalsk is an industrial town on the 
                                                
21 Думова, И. И., Механизмы Управления Региональным Природопользованием, 15. 
22 Федерация России. Государственный Центр Экологических Программ: Правительственной 
Комиссии по Байкалу. "Влияние Качества Окружающей Среды на Здоровье Населения" Охрана 
Озера Байкал и Обеспечени Рационального Природопользов в Байкальском Регионе: n.p., 1997. 
Print., 39  
23Ibid., 38. 
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shores of Lake Baikal. The citizens of the town are largely employed at the Baikalsk 
Paper and Pulp Mill (BPPM), which has gained media attention since its establishment 
in the 1960s for its contribution to environmental degradation. As in many factory 
towns, the residents of Baikalsk depend on the mill for employment. Consequently, 
workers must often choose between leaving their home to find work in another town or 
face the negative effects of human industrial activity on their health. Career 
opportunities, associated with socioeconomic status and access to education, alter 
individuals’ ability to manage the health risks of living and working in an industry that 
is detrimental to the natural environment and to their personal health. Mainly, they may 
not have the luxury of moving to a new town or changing profession as their jobs are 
limited by their financial means, education level, and mobility (e.g., access to a car). 
Likewise, residents of towns like Baikalsk often do not have the political power to 
demand upgrades to the factory to improve environmental sustainability. 
 Despite the barriers to environmentalism on Baikal, movements have emerged 
throughout the twentieth century, frequently in response to potential health risks of 
environmental degradation. The conditions for environmental movements today have 
precedence in the standards set during the transitory period between communism and 
capitalism in the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s. It would be remiss, however, to 
assume that environmentalism during the transitory period appeared without influence 
from Soviet environmental policies and movements. Indeed, environmentalism during 
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the transition to democracy and capitalism after the fall of the USSR expanded upon 
trends from the Soviet period, while also changing with the constraints and opportunities 
of the times. In order to understand the significance of the trends in environmentalism 
during the years of transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, we must 




Chapter Two: Environmentalism in Russia during the Soviet Period 
 
  At almost 6.6 million square miles, the Russian Federation boasts the title of the 
largest country in the world. Its impressive area houses diverse and unique ecosystems: 
tundra, coniferous forests of the Taiga, the grasslands of the steppe, and semi-desert 
along the Caspian Sea. Today in Russia alone, not to mention in the former Soviet states, 
there are 25 UNESCO heritage sites with 26 additional sites on a tentative list.24 With 
this vast wealth of natural resources, questions of environmental conservation and 
exploitation have arisen throughout Russia’s long history. As previously mentioned, 
during the time of the Golden Horde (the Mongol occupation of Russia) Genghis Khan 
proclaimed Baikal a “Great Forbiddance Zone” and forbade activities that could harm 
the purity and beauty of the lake. In the eighteenth century Catherine the Great 
established hunting laws, which scholars have since marked as an early form of 
environmentalism.25 Early signs of natural resource management underscore the 
historical precedence for environmental regulation in Russia.  
 In the twentieth century, Russia had numerous forms of leadership: Tsarism, a 
communist state, a federal presidential republic. Each new governance system brought 
new economic policies and approaches to the nation’s natural resources. Within the 
                                                
24 UNESCO. "Russian Federation." United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 
Accessed January 23, 2013. http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ru. 
25 Weiner, Douglas R. 1999. A Little Corner of Freedom Russian: Nature Protection from Stalin to 
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Soviet period, the country underwent rapid industrialization along with political turmoil, 
both of which influenced the ability of environmentalists to enact natural protection 
regulations and to speak out in support of natural wonders, such as Baikal. The 
differences between the Soviet leaders determined the focus of the environmental 
movement and the institutions, e.g., regional committees that participated in 
environmental debates. In the following section we will review the key moments in 
Russian environmentalism as they related to the politics of the time with a focus on the 
eras of Stalin and Khrushchev. In doing so, we find that on the one hand the periods of 
greatest environmentalist activity and legal protection came with periods of political 
freedom, e.g., the Khrushchev Thaw. At the same time, the years of greatest political 
repression, such as during Stalin’s time in power, set the tone for the use and misuse of 
natural resources. Consequently, the areas that experienced the greatest environmental 
degradation during Stalin’s era also became focal points for the environmentalist 
movement. The combination of these forces continues to dictate environmental policies 
today. Starting with Stalin’s reconstruction of Russian waterways during the 1930s, 
which positions Baikal at the center of environmental debates, I will then discuss the 
ways that environmentalists protected the environment within the Gulag state. For this 
section I adopt the term ‘Gulag state’ from the work of environmental historian Douglas 
Weiner. Gulag state refers to the Soviet political system in which the government 
favored sending criminals (including political dissenters) to forced labor camps. Gulag is 
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an acronym for the Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies. 
From the discussion of the Gulag state, we will move to the Khrushchev period when the 
legacy of Stalin’s hydroelectric projects continued to inform the major threats to Baikal; 
yet, new links between nationalism and preservation of natural resources allowed for 
greater public participation in environmental debates surrounding the lake.  
 
A) Water, V iolence, and the Gulag 
 
  The 1930s in the Soviet Union are often referred to as the period of “The Great 
Terror” because of the extreme State repression, mass disappearances of citizens, and 
the relocation of millions to the infamous Gulag forced labor camps. The specific 
projects the Gulag workers undertook positioned water at the center of environmentalist 
concerns. While activists could not speak out in opposition of the Gulags without risking 
their own lives and the lives of their families, they could take action to protect the 
waterways that were frequently the sites of violence of the forced labor camps. 
Consequently, issues that threatened the “integrity of Soviet, especially Russian, waters 
elicited the passionate opposition of all varieties of environmentalists.”26 Under the 
direction of S.I. Zhuk, head of the Main Hydrological Construction Agency of the 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the prisoners of the Gulags labored on the 
reconstruction of Russia’s waterways. His projects included the Moscow-Volga Canal, 
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the Volga-Don Canal, and the Rybinsk hydrostation.27 Nature protection activists at the 
time started to make the connection “between Stalin’s violent transformation of the land 
and his violent, instrumental treatment of humans.”28  
 Here we should note why we consider the reconstruction of Russia’s waterways 
within the Gulag state an act of violence and not merely a misuse of resources. We count 
the transformation of nature as violence because of the severity of the changes to 
Russia’s landscapes and because of the abuse of the Gulag prisoners who performed the 
majority of the manual labor. A prime example of the destructive force behind the Gulag 
hydroelectric projects is the White Sea Canal. Originally named the Stalin White Sea-
Baltic Sea Canal, this massive project was completed in April of 1933 after only twenty 
months of construction. Under Stalin’s Five Year Plans, the first of which spanned from 
1928 to 1933, the most important objective was to finish the project as quickly as 
possible. The White Sea Canal was meant to serve as a symbol of the State’s power and 
so, all resources were devoted to its completion. However, in this case, resources meant 
forced laborers. There was an overall dearth of technology utilized and the work of the 
White Sea Canal was done by hand.29 The government meant for the brutal conditions of 
the camp to serve as corrective labor and reform class enemies (political prisoners) as 
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well as common criminals.30 The 100,000 prisoners worked in brigades of 25 who 
carved out 2.5 cubic meters of stone per day per brigade by hand or with only primitive 
tools. Estimates of the mortality rate for the project are around 8.7% with additional 
prisoners sick or disabled.31 The high mortality rate of the workers testifies to the 
physical suffering that went into the canal’s construction. Prisoners of the Gulags were 
criminals and disposable. If a worker died, the managers of the Gulag easily found a 
replacement. 
 Likewise, the strict timeframe meant that the work was done with little regard for 
the destruction of nature. In fact, Zeev Wolfson, a senior Soviet official who authored 
“The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union,” argues that Stalin saw the 
transformation of natural landscapes as a sign of Soviet power. The more projects, such 
as the White Sea Canal, contradicted the laws of nature “the more highly they were 
regarded,” because “the more brilliantly the illusion of their success demonstrated the 
power and wisdom of the new leaders.”32 The same ideas contributed to the shrinking of 
the Aral Sea, formerly the world’s fourth largest saline lake in the world, by seventy-five 
percent. The Soviet government diverted the Amu Daria and Syr Daria rivers in order to 
irrigate the desert region surrounding the sea for agriculture. Consequently, the area 
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around the sea experiences significant desertification and dust storms to this day. 
Furthermore, the decrease in fresh water in the region exacerbated economic struggles 
caused by demographic growth and hyperinflation after the fall of the USSR.33 Stalin’s 
push for the transformation of rivers, lakes, and streams to glorify the State’s political 
and economic power led to drastic changes to the environment and to the economy of 
the region. Because of the severity of these transformations of the environment, we 
consider the river diversion project to be evidence of violence. 
  The link between the state’s violence against humanity and reconstruction of 
waterways went both ways. The reflections of Andrei Dostoevskii, the nephew of the 
author of Crime and Punishment, support this assertion. Returning from a Gulag 
sentence working on a hydrological project, he realized that “‘violence to nature and 
violence to people literally went hand in hand.’”34 In times of greater political repression 
the exploitation of Russia’s natural resources increased accordingly. Logically, during 
Stalin’s years this fact came about partially because the political prisoners of the Gulags 
supplied the manual labor to rework the land. In this way, one form of violence 
facilitated the other and vice versa. After Stalin’s death in 1953 the violence of the 
Gulags decreased and so too did the fervor of the hydroelectric projects, though neither 
came to a halt completely. 
                                                
33 The Aral Sea Crisis. Last modified 2008. Accessed April 3, 2013. 
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 During the time of Stalin’s administration, environmental scientists evaded 
punishment by modeling environmental protection agencies after government 
organizations already in place.  Various groups formed for the protection of nature: The 
All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (VOOP), Moscow Society of 
Naturalists (MOIP), Geographical Society of USSR (MGO), etc. The union of scientists 
under these formal societies fits into broader trends in Soviet era nature protection, 
which was characterized by “the search for institutional space” safe from “governmental 
scrutiny,” in order to speak on behalf of the environment.35 Stalin himself spearheaded a 
major campaign to protect the environment: The Great Stalin Plan for the 
Transformation of Nature. While propaganda promoted the Great Plan as a grandiose 
project “to construct 5.7 million hectares of forest in the Russian south,” it collapsed 
after Stalin’s death in 1953.36 In Conservation in the Soviet Union, Philip Pryde argues 
that the “‘Great Plan’ clearly reflected the view of man as the master and perfecter of his 
natural environment, rather than as an integral and interdependent component of it.”37 
This ideology is also “indicative of Stalin’s basically domineering attitude towards 
natural resource exploitation and conservation.”38  
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 While the societies for the protection of nature and Stalin’s Great Plan represent 
the potential for important conservation initiatives, both had limited effectiveness 
because of the repression of scientific research at the time. Stalin’s favoritism and 
promotion of his political agenda often undermined the autonomy of scientists and the 
pursuit of truth through the scientific process. One prime example of this occurrence is 
the rise to power of Trofim Lysenko. Soviet leaders appointed Lysenko as the Director 
of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1940. He most 
likely won the position because of his promise for a more rapid, more plentiful, and 
lower cost crop yield based on his unsubstantiated experiments. Lysenko rejected 
traditional genetic thought and took on Michurinism, a form of genetics developed by an 
untrained plant breeder. By 1948 education in standard genetics was practically 
outlawed. Many orthodox geneticists faced arrest, which frequently led to death of 
undisclosed causes. The persecution of geneticists who did not support Lysenko’s vision 
for agricultural development exemplifies the fate of scientists in other fields whose 
views did not align with the State’s ideas. Additionally, Weiner attributes the over-
simplification of scientific facts in the Great Plan to the unconventional and 
unsubstantiated scientific methodology that Lysenko promoted.39 Lysenko’s story also 
illustrates that while environmental scientists had institutions for conservation work, 
they had to conform to Soviet scientific ideals that favored certain ideas, such as those of 
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Lysenko, based on political favoritism. As as a result, these scientists could not be as 
productive as possible.  
 Despite the persecution of those scientists who did conform to the state’s norms, 
environmentalists did find ways to work within Soviet institutions to protect natural 
resources, including those in the Baikal region. Faced with terror of the Gulags and 
disappearances of scientists, environmentalists developed the idea of the zapovednik, 
which countered the violence against nature inflicted by the Gulag system. 
 
B) The Establishment and Development of Zapovedniki  
  During the 1930s the concept of the zapovednik, the Russian equivalent of a 
nature reserve, emerged. Douglas R. Weiner calls the institutions that formed around the 
zapovedniki an “archipelago of freedom” that survived within the Gulag state.40 The 
zapovedniki were one of the most important institutions of natural protection in the 
Russian Federation. While they came in response to Stalin’s hydroelectric projects, 
receiving the zapovednik status became crucial to Baikal later in the 1950s and 1960s 
when Khrushchev was in office. The development of the zapovedniki was characterized 
“by uneven rates, with fluctuations with the separate periods” in which the concept 
evolved under the supervision of various visionaries and scientists.41   
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 V. P.  Semenovy Tian Shanskii first came up with the idea for a zapovednik in 
1917 as “‘reserves in line with American national parks.’”42 Six years later (in 1923) the 
idea became a detailed scheme for classifying the reservation areas with respect to both 
zoning and also regional features in Russia.43 While both of these loose definitions failed 
to provide specific parameters for the location, size, etc. of the zapovedniki they did set 
the base for environmentalist V. N. Markova. Markova is best known for creating a list 
of potential sites for zapovedniki and for estimating the size for each reserve.44 
 After Markova defined the location and size of the zapovednik, various 
committees and unions formed to promote the nature reserves. By 1950 Russia boasted 
forty-five zapovedniki. In 1953 the USSR Zapovednik Committee took on the 
responsibility of assembling a proposal “to reestablish and expand” the geographic 
network of zapovedniki.45 However, the committee was unsuccessful as the number of 
zapovedniki reduced significantly in 1955 and 1961. These fluctuations continued as 
new leaders worked on the projects and new politics shaped the political freedom of the 
environmental movement. 
 Nonetheless, important ecological reserves did form throughout Russia. 
Furthermore, the territory of the northern taiga of Eastern Siberia that borders the Baikal 
                                                
42 Соколов, В.Е, et.al, 1997. Экология Заповедных Территорий России. Москва: Янус–К 




region, and the Transbaikal steppes came under zapovednik protection.46 By fitting into 
the push of activists to institutionalize natural protection efforts, the zapovednik reserve 
system became a focal point of environmentalism. In effect, the zapovedniki served as 
one of many responses to the reconstruction of nature under the Gulag system as they 
protected certain areas from ventures for the sake of economic development. When 
Baikal became a zapovednik in the late 1960s, the lake and the surrounding forests both 
received protection. This official classification also put Baikal at the center of 
environmental debates.   
 Following the guidelines of the “International Classified Scale of Protected 
Natural Terroritories of the Former Soviet Union” (Table 1) illustrated in Экология 
Заповедных Территорий России/ Ecology of Protected Territories of Russia, Baikal fit 
into more than one category: Natural Scientific Reserves of a Strict Regime, Natural 
Monuments, Areas of World Heritage. While the legal restrictions of nature reserves in 
the Soviet Union could not always promise to uphold environmental codes in the face of 
political or military opportunities, Baikal’s classification as a protected territory 






                                                




Level of Classification Title of Classification 
(available example) 
I.  Natural Scientific 
Reserves of a Strict 
Regime (Zapovedniki) 
II. National Parks 
(National parks, natural 
parks) 





IV. Reserves of natural 
protection destinations 
V. Protected landscapes 
VI. Resource protecting 
reserves 
VII.  Resource protecting 
areas and territories of 
multipurpose 
management and use 
VIII. Biosphere reserves 
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C) Zapovednik and Public Participation 
 Particularly, Baikal’s zapovednik status proved important in the 1950s. The All-
Union Hydrological Planning and Scientific Research Institute planned to detonate the 
mouth of the Angara, Baikal’s only out-flowing river in order to increase the amount of 
water going to the hydroelectric dams. This would have resulted in Baikal’s water levels 
decreasing by several meters.47 In response, in August of 1958 the Academy of Sciences 
Council on Productive Forces sponsored a conference on the development of lucrative 
resources of Eastern Siberia in Irkutsk. This conference inspired subsequent mini 
conferences in Ulan Ude, Krasnoiarsk, and Chita. The 5,690 attendees of these 
conferences came to the consensus that Baikal should become a zapovednik with a 10 
kilometer radius of protected forests surrounding the lake. Had the lake not gained a 
zapovednik title, species residing in Baikal and the area surrounding would have lost 
significant habitat because of the decreased water levels and deforestation. To many, this 
would have meant the loss of the awe-inspiring beauty of Baikal that had astounded 
visitors for centuries.  
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 While pressures from the timber industry, which saw the potential for significant 
economic gain, motivated the plan to demolish the mouth of the Angara, opponents to 
the plan argued that Baikal as a zapovednik  had greater economic value. The argument 
for the protection of Baikal as a zapovednik marked a collaboration between scientists, 
journalists, and economists. For example, the head of the Baikal Limnological Station at 
Listvianka “equipped the journalists [Taurin and Gaidi] with scientific data and 
arguments" to write a letter outlining the reasons to protect Lake Baikal.48 Signatures 
from important figures including the hydroelectric station’s chief engineer and the 
deputy to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet gave the letter greater credibility. The writers of 
the letter also bolstered its argument with projections of how  the project “would affect 
fisheries...water supplies...and even railroad bridges in the area,” all of which would 
result in significant economic losses.49 The writers submitted their final letter titled “In 
Defense of Baikal” to the Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literature Gazette) in October of 1958. 
Taurin and Gaidi’s work ignited an unprecedented response from the public. The 
journalists felt that the response to their letter spoke to the “‘broad public’” investment 
in the lake’s well being.50  
 The ability of the journalists to spark the involvement of the public in these 
debates also exemplifies the power of writers in environmental movements. As we will 
                                                




discuss in greater depth in Chapter Three when analyzing the work of Valentin Rasputin, 
writers in Russia serve as a voice of civic conscience. Often leading subcultural 
movements, writers were traditionally the first to critique the government even when 
facing arrest, exile, or death. In the environmentalist movement writers maintained this 
outspoken role. As we look at the ways environmentalists worked within political and 
cultural contexts to protect Lake Baikal, influential writers will continue to emerge. In 
addition to Gaidi and Taurin, we will see the importance of Valentin Rasputin and 
Vladimir Chivilikhin to the environmental movement. 
 The levels of public participation in the fight for Baikal’s zapovednik status also 
testify to the altered political climate following Stalin’s death. As previously mentioned, 
the decline of the Gulag state also led to a decrease in the number of industrialization 
projects and allowed for greater public participation in environmental debates 
surrounding Baikal. Specifically, Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership created opportunities 
for activism to protect the lake. His time in leadership came to be known as the 
Khrushchev Thaw for his de-Stalinization campaign and reform of domestic policies. 
 
D) The Khrushchev Thaw and the Construction of the Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill  
 After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev came to power as the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like Stalin, Khrushchev 
eliminated his political rivals; however, instead of killing them he assigned them to posts 
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far away, such as in Mongolia. Having joined the Bolsheviks in 1918, Khrushchev had 
been with Stalin since the beginning. His long history with Stalin made his “secret 
speech” of 1956 all the more shocking to party members. In this speech, he denounced 
the excesses of Stalin’s era. At the time, his account of Stalin’s crimes against the Party 
(though not against the country) was ground breaking because it went against taboos of 
the time against speaking negatively about Stalin.  
 When in power, Khrushchev advocated for an all-people’s state that would 
involve the citizens more fully in governing their own lives.51 This new stance on citizen 
participation in governance provided opportunities for public involvement in 
environmental protection. Participation in the conservation movement was encouraged 
from above and coincided with the leader’s push for economic efficiency. Public 
contribution in conservation debates even facilitated the economic reforms in that “it 
expanded and diversified the sources of feedback for monitoring the economical use of 
scarce natural resources in a system just beginning the shift to intensive economic 
growth.”52 The results of the simultaneous drive for economic development and the 
involvement of the people in environmental debates, appear in the Baikal region. With 
Khrushchev’s inclusion of local Soviets, youth groups, and conservation societies in the 
decision making process for “less sensitive policy areas,” (i.e., environmental issues) 
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came new opportunities for the people’s involvement in the environmental movement on 
Baikal.   
 The relative spirit of freedom for the environmentalist movement in Russia as a 
whole coincided with increased industry on Baikal. Indeed, in the 1960s on Baikal the 
connection between war and the exploitation of nature reached new heights. The debates 
that had begun over the demolition of the mouth of the Angara river continued as 
political elites planned the construction of a major military-industrial installation to 
make viscose cord for airplane tires.53 While not threatening the water levels of Lake 
Baikal, the proposed factories would introduce an abundance of chemicals and thermal 
pollution into the lake’s waters. At first, the public did not know of the true purpose of 
the factory as the project was fronted as a paper and pulp mill. Ironically, the factory 
today does serve as a paper mill.  
 As industrialization projects continued to threaten Baikal, there were also new 
spaces for environmental activism under Khrushchev’s policies that emphasized public 
participation. Just as Taurin and Gaidi inspired public outrage at the plan to explode the 
mouth of the Angara, the work of journalists of the Literaturnaia Gazeta revealed the 
truth about the factory to the country. Everyday citizens rallied around the cause by 
writing letters to newspapers and joining environmental organizations. While the factory 
was completed in 1966, the “concentrated protests of scientific and literary public” 
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demonstrate the environmentalist niches that writers and scientists alike could fill and 
their power to rally public support for issues concerning Baikal.54 
 The controversy first took center stage in the pages of Literaturnia Gazeta. 
Through the work of Taurin, the media was once again able to expose the true plans of 
the factories to the public. Under the direction of Editor in Chief Sergei Sergeevich 
Smirnov, Taurin arranged an interview with the chairman of the Academy’s Council of 
Productive Forces.55 Through this connection Taurin became an acquaintance of Boris 
Aleksandrovich Smirnov, who worked as chief engineer for the Siberian Planning 
Institute for the Paper Industry. “Insinuat[ing] himself into Smirnov’s confidence,” 
Taurin feigned ignorance of the environmental dangers of the factories. Unknowing of 
Taurin’s true interests in the factor, Smirnov revealed the actual intentions for the 
factory’s use.56 The resulting paper, “Baikal Must Become a Zapovednik” spoke to the 
significance of the zapovednik status while also taking on “all of the lake’s enemies 
[e.g., unregulated industry, those who opposed the protection of the lake] at once.”57 
 Taurin’s paper in 1959 spurred further publications related to the protection of 
the lake.  One of the first of such publications was a collective letter from the USSR 
Academy of Sciences Commission on the Protection of Nature titled “To the Defense of 
Baikal.” In 1960 the collective work of these writers and scientists resulted in legislation 
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requiring the installation of pollution abatement technologies––––technologies such as 
ash collection filters that decrease the amount of emissions into the water and air–––
before the new factories could begin operation. On May 9 the RSFSR passed specific 
laws to safeguard the protection of Baikal and its basin and in so doing, reinforced the 
necessity of waste purification technologies before the start-up of the Baikalsk Paper and 
Pulp Mill. This legislation testifies to the importance of the union between scientists and 
writers in influencing political decisions related to the environment.  
 When other newspapers took part in the discussion public awareness of 
environmental issues in the region and in the country expanded. In April of 1963 the 
journal Oktiabr’ published Vladimir Chivilikhin's article, “Luminous Eye of Siberia.”58 
Douglas Weiner calls Chivilikhin’s piece “the most famous of all of the essays on 
Baikal” and indeed, the public response to the article parallels the outrage following the 
publication of  Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring in the United States.59 The article 
follows Chivilikhin on his journey discovering Baikal. The writer wakes up one day 
with an urge to travel to Siberia and so, he decides to go to the Irkutsk Oblast. His first 
comments are on the welcoming nature of the people of Irkutsk and he immediately 
debunks Russian stereotypes that Siberians are quiet and behind the times. His sense of 
modernity seems to align with the quality of nature in the city. Noting the many open 
                                                




gardens and green spaces, he calls the town of Angarsk the “symbol of modernity.” 60 
As he explores the beautiful shores of Baikal and the surrounding Taiga forests, 
Chivilikhin meets ecologists who study the health of the lake. They inform him of the 
planned construction of the Selenga factory and the detrimental effects it would have on 
the ecology of Baikal’s water. Reader and writer learn together about the importance of 
keeping Baikal clean and saving the surrounding Taiga forest.   
 Once he establishes the science behind the dangers of the pollution, he comes to 
the heart of the piece when he calls for public activism to protect the lake. Chivilikhin 
initially addresses youth because of their “energy,” but he then goes on to call on all 
Soviet people.61 For example, referencing leaders of the USSR, he appeals to Soviet 
enthusiasts. His deference to Soviet leaders may also have helped him avoid punishment 
by the government for his critique of industry. Specifically, he quotes Lenin as saying 
that “‘we must ensure....compliance with scientific and technical standards’” when 
taking raw materials from the land.62 Chivilikhin also cites Khrushchev, who declared 
that ““we must protect our forests because they are a national treasure. It is best to use 
this treasure responsibly’” for the sake of future generations.63 Khrushchev’s words 
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become the key point to Chivilikhin’s argument: we must use Baikal’s responsibly so 
that future Soviet generations may also benefit from the lake.  
  Adding urgency to his plea, he notes that unless the construction of the factories 
ceases immediately, Baikal will never be revived to its the former beauty and purity.64 In 
his final statement he reinforces the importance of the preservation of Baikal for future 
generations. Saying that “the luminous eye of Siberia will live well and eternally and the 
people of communism will be able to reap the benefits from its full and clean cup,” 
Chivilikhin offers a vision of the ideal future for Baikal. The fulfillment of this vision 
depends upon the efforts of  Soviet citizens.65 The combination of the urgency of his 
plea, the appeals to pride for the Soviet Union’s natural resources, and the clear goal of 
preventing the construction of the factories made it easy for people to rally around his 
vision for the future of Baikal.  
  Following the article’s publication, the newspaper saw a massive influx of letters 
to the editor responding to Chivilikhin's article. The newspaper decided to publish these 
responses in order to prove that the “‘average person, wherever he or she may live, 
wants to know everything that is happening in his/her country. As a master of his/her 
fate, the average Soviet person often demands that his/her opinion, too, be taken into 
account.’”66 Though the preface to the letters dramatized the societal reaction, the fact 
that there were enough responses to warrant inclusion in the newspaper suggests that 
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public involvement in environmental protection efforts had reached a new level. 
Furthermore, the preface referred to Soviet citizens generally and not specifically to 
those on Baikal. This reflects the broader interest in environmental issues that the 
debates over Baikal ignited.  
 The previously mentioned connections between Stalin’s rule and the violence 
against nature left a scar on Soviet citizens, as Douglas Weiner notes.67 The memory of 
Stalin’s years may have informed the great interest in Baikal during the Khrushchev era 
and inspired the huge public response in the media. Stalin’s violence against nature and 
the Soviet people directly affected Oleg Volkov. Volkov spent twenty seven years in a 
Gulag camp for refusing to spy on the Greek Embassy in Moscow. Released by 
Khrushchev, Volkov joined the media debates as “the literary voice of the field 
biologists/nature protection activists.”68 He argued that no single agency or institution 
should have the right to determine the exclusive use of the lake. In a way, the question 
of who should own the rights to Baikal, addresses concerns over who should have the 
power to make decisions at a local level. Moscow having absolute control of ecological 
management on Baikal robs local citizens of their right to decide the fate of their 
homeland. In an opposing example, if the peoples of Baikal have control over the 
regulation of Baikal’s resources, they are more empowered to make change in their 
communities. The government’s decision not to support local input on ecological issues 
                                                
67 Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom, 357. 
68 Ibid., 364.  
Korsgard 50 
sends a clear message that the powers in Moscow are less concerned with the vision of 
the people and more concerned with their own agendas. Just as Volkov was punished for 
choosing not to become a spy (as government officials wanted) and political prisoners 
suffered from human rights violations in the Gulags, the federal government’s ultimate 
control in ecological matters prohibits local communities from the  decision making 
process regarding uses for the lake. The importance of participation in decisions 
concerning the local environment are especially important in the Baikal region because 
of the cultural and spiritual connection to the lake that dates back to the twelfth century 
and earlier. 
 Overall, the debates over the construction of the Baikalsk Paper and Pulp Mill 
represented the combination of the Stalinist fixation on industrialization and the new, 
more open policies under Khrushchev, which supported local outspokenness concerning 
environmental issues. The controversy over Baikal reached a broader public than 
environmental debates had previously as it drew in responses from across the country 
and for many made environmental concerns a point of national pride. In this way these 
debates not only fit into the culture of the time, but also set new standards moving 
forward. The Baikalsk Paper and Pulp Mill still holds significance today as 




Chapter Three: Valentin Rasputin and Environmentalism Through Village 
Prose 
 
A) Introduction to Village Prose 
 Aside from newspaper articles and media debates, there are few testimonies from 
the individuals most affected by the environmental degradation caused by Stalin’s 
hydroelectric projects. The construction of dams and the rerouting of river-ways 
associated with Stalin’s Great Plan for the Transformation of Nature continued in the 
Baikal region. With each new water project, the citizens of Baikal experienced some of 
the violence that occurred during the Gulag nature transformation projects. Villagers 
living along the rivers there, notably the Angara River, had to relocate due to the 
flooding caused by the erection of dams. Understandably this displacement caused stress 
and disillusionment for the Siberian villagers forced to abandon their homes and 
communities in search of work and dry land.  
 While at times it was dangerous to speak out against the state, writers, like 
scientists, “had both the moral and the social standing to make their opinions felt even in 
a highly repressive system.”69 This spirit of rebellion and countercultural movements 
had particularly strong roots for writers of the Baikal region. Many residents descended 
from political exiles of both the tsars and Bolsheviks. As Taurin notes, this gave birth to 
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a special culture, which “imbibed the idea of personal honor and a feeling of their own 
dignity through the black years of Stalin’s arbitrary rule.”70 Many of those exiled were 
writers, who were sent to Siberia as punishment for controversial works. Indeed, the 
tradition of the writer as an “alternative government” and civic conscience who used 
prose, fiction, plays, and other works to protest repressive regimes began in Tsarist 
Russia. The place of the writer as an actor in countercultural movements combined with 
the alternative culture that grew from the population of political exiles suggests that the 
Baikal region would have a wealth of literature in defense of the lake. Unfortunately, 
Stalin’s years high rates of arrests and disappearances discouraged the formation of a 
prominent environmental literary movement.71 Further working against the participation 
of authors in the efforts to protect Baikal was the fact that few writers aligned with the 
scientific intelligentsia's nature protection movement. However, during the Khrushchev 
Thaw writers and scientists found a new framework for environmentalism. Within this 
framework “Russian culture could not be preserved in its integrity without preserving 
integral Russian landscapes and the Russian village.”72 Writers could demonstrate pride 
for their Russian roots through the preservation of the country’s natural features (rivers, 
forests, lakes, etc). The connection between saving Russia’s landscapes and the 
preservation of culture gave the movement a nationalistic tone based in pride for their 
local environments and traditions.  
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 Village Prose became the perfect literary genre to embrace this new nationalistic 
take on the environmental movement as it idealized the traditional Russian village. It 
gained popularity among Siberian writers, such as Valentin Rasputin, who contributed to 
the discussion of environmentalism and critique of the government’s industrialization 
projects. A Baikal native, Rasputin’s work encompassed the experiences of Baikalians 
across many different waves of environmentalism on Baikal during the twentieth 
century. In his discussion of displaced population resulting from hydroelectric projects, 
Rasputin addresses the consequences of Stalin’s industrialization and reconstruction of 
water ways. That said, his stories often take place in the post-war period, including 
Khrushchev’s time in office. Rasputin himself did much of his writing during the 1980s 
as Gorbachev was rising to power. In this way, Rasputin’s writing is not only a form of 
environmental protest, but also illustrates the overlap and interaction between the 
environmental policy of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev.  
 In light of the persecution of writers in previous decades, Rasputin’s work, which 
highlights the failures in the industrialization of the Soviet system, could have brought 
him severe punishment. However, the more open policies of Khrushchev and Gorbachev 
gave writers some freedom to critique government projects. Due to loosened policies 
that started with Khrushchev and continued with Gorbachev, Rasputin’s criticism of the 
hydroelectric projects were tolerated in 1980s. More than tolerance, Rasputin has 
received many honors for his work. He was awarded  “communism’s Nobel Prize,” the 
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Order of Lenin.73 Additionally, in 2002 President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir 
Putin, presented him with the Order of Merit for the Fatherland.74 If we take his stories 
as works of environmentalism, then we must also acknowledge Rasputin as one of the 
most acclaimed environmentalists in the country.  
 The popularity of his work stems from the fact that the experiences of his 
characters spoke to people of multiple generations. His stories represent the struggles, 
which Baikalian citizens faced because of the reconstruction of waterways that began 
with Stalin. Rasputin’s work also illustrates the role environmental concerns played in 
the dynamics between the government and the citizens. We will first look at the specific 
historical context and personal connection Rasputin had to the displaced villagers to 
establish the relevance and genuineness behind his work. Second, we will turn to his 
prominent short stories that relate to the changes to the environment of Baikal. Third, we 
will assess his non-fiction writings on Baikal.  
 
B) Construction of the Bratsk Dam and Rasputin’s Childhood   
 After six years of labor, often in brutal weather conditions, in 1961 the Bratsk 
hydroelectric station was completed. The three-mile-long dam stretched across the 
Angara River.  On September 1, 1961 the reservoir slowly began to fill. The dam was an 
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impressive feat of engineering and became a source of pride and patriotism for some 
including writer Evgenii Evtushenko, who wrote: “‘In the Bratsk Station, Russia, your 
motherly image shimmering unfolded itself to me.’”75 His word of “shimmering” makes 
the dam seem like mirror or window revealing the glory of the homeland. This imagery 
resembles Chivilikhin’s metaphor of Baikal as a “luminous eye” to Siberia. This time, 
however, the word choice is used to describe something that hurt the natural 
environmental of the Baikal. The filled reservoir caused the water levels on the Angara 
River near the dam site to rise by almost 500 feet.76 Consequently, the lower reaches of 
the river flooded, leading to the loss of numerous rural Russian communities. The 
technological accomplishment that caused pride for planners and some Siberian natives, 
such as Evtushenko, led countless others to lose their homes. 
 Valentin Rasputin was among those who lost their childhood hometowns to the 
dam. Rasputin spent most of his childhood with his mother and grandmother in a small 
town called Atalanka where his father worked as a logger. In his youth, his mother sent 
him to Ust-Uda, a larger city nearby, to finish his education. Water played an important 
part in Rasputin’s childhood. Growing up along the Angara, Rasputin spent countless 
days fishing, swimming, and playing in the river. Ironically, however, flooding of the 
same river due to construction of the Bratsk dam caused him to lose his favorite 
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childhood stomping grounds, a fact that influenced the focus of his writing.77 In an 
interview with People magazine in 1987 Rasputin lamented the loss of his childhood 
stomping grounds. "I don't think I was even 1 year old when I started to fish,” he 
reflected. “Now, three hydropower stations have been built on the Angara, and a fourth 
is under construction. These are tragic changes.”78 The contrast between the river as a 
source of joy in his youth and as the reason for the disappearance of his community 
perhaps made the flooding of the Angara even more meaningful to the writer.  
 World War II further shaped his sense of community. Born in 1937, Rasputin 
grew up during the war. After the war, which in Russia is known as the Great Patriotic 
War, the country suffered from famine and economic hardship. Communities had to ban 
together to make ends meet during and after the war. The struggle of his fellow citizens 
had a significant impact on him. Consequently, his literature was “shaped by the 
ubiquitous postwar famine and by the heroic communal coping efforts of his hardy 
fellow villagers.79 
 Since then, Rasputin has not strayed far from his roots. He attended Irkutsk State 
University and now lives in the provincial capital, although he frequently spends time at 
his country home on the shores of the Angara. That said, his proximity, literally and 
figuratively, to the Angara does not mean that his stories represent the fates and feelings 
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of all affected by the flooding of the river. Siberian residents had varying experiences 
and opinions, as the writer Evtushenko’s nationalistic proclamation about the dam 
proves. Rasputin’s stories provide one perspective on the alteration to the environment 
and the subsequent damage to Russian communities. His personal history testifies to the 
authenticity of the voice of his characters and makes the stories convincing.  
 
C)  A  Significant Short Story by Rasputin:“The Fire” 
  Rasputin’s short story, “The Fire,” captures the experiences of the Baikalian 
villager and the consequences of the Bratsk Dam’s construction. While this story was 
published in 1985, the characters and plot could apply to anytime after 1961, the year of 
the dam’s construction. The story is told through the eyes of Ivan Petrovich, a middle-
aged man who has become disillusioned by the drowning of his hometown. Rasputin 
provides a vivid description of postwar Russian provinces in Siberia and the rapid 
industrialization. The protagonist does not have any extraordinary abilities or 
characteristics and thus represents the average man. Consequently, the story becomes 
universal and the reader can easily see how Ivan Petrovich’s perspective would apply to 
others in his situation. At the beginning, the protagonist ponders the unsatisfactory state 
of his life in his new town with apathy. As Ivan Petrovich reflects on his experience in 
the war and the loss of this hometown, we discover that the warehouse, the principal 
source of income for the town, has been set on fire. Ivan’s decisions and observations 
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throughout the fire allow us to see the priorities and circumstances of the villagers. At 
the same time, the protagonist’s flashbacks allow the reader to sense the nostalgia and 
longing for his old life.  
 In “The Fire” Rasputin not only gives vivid descriptions of village life, but 
allows us to glean that while technically there may have been more freedom to speak out 
against the state during the Khrushchev Thaw and Gorbachev’s glasnost’, other cultural 
and social factors inhibited the citizens most impacted by environmental degradation 
from participating in environmental activism. These factors include the dearth of socio-
economic opportunities for the workers, the psychological impact of displacement, and 
the corruption that undermined legislation for economic development and environmental 
protections.  
 From the beginning we see that Ivan Petrovich has negative views towards the 
industry’s shaping of the natural environment through his description of the timber 
industry in his region. He equates the heavy deforestation of the area as “fine tooth 
combing” of the woods, implying that every tree available had been taken by the 
forestry industry and left the forest barren.80 Remembering the arrival of the timber 
company in his community seems evoke fear as Ivan states that the “well-heeled logging 
operation appeared like a threat hanging over Yegerovsk.”81 Ironically, Ivan Petrovich 
himself works for the timber company. In light of the fact that he earns his living from 
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the logging industry, we would expect him to take a positive tone towards the company 
rather than the negative one that he does. This underscores the importance of the 
environment to the character. For Ivan Petrovich, the resources of the forest are more 
profound than the timber. The gains for the lumber industry from deforestation signify 
for him a great loss of resources that outweighs the gain. He notes that when famine 
came to his family following World War II they turned to the Angara and Taiga for food 
and water. However, as the forests are depleted and the rivers polluted the wealth of 
resources (potable water, animals to hunt, edible vegetation) he and his family had 
depended upon after the war decreases. Furthermore, the same wave of industrialization 
that provided him work in the logging business also left him homeless after the flooding 
of the Angara from the hydroelectric station. The fact remains that regardless of his 
personal opinions of the consequences of industrialization, he is financially dependent 
on the timber industry as he has few to no other employment opportunities.  
 Perhaps because of this dependence on the industry that left him homeless, the 
protagonist considers himself helpless. After surviving World War II, he works for the 
logging industry with limited other employment possibilities and is therefore dependent 
on the same companies that contribute to the despicable conditions of his environment. 
He does not have the economic opportunities to leave the industry that is destroying the 
land he holds dear. Likewise, he does not have the political sway to force the industry to 
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change. These experiences have left him apathetic about the desolate conditions around 
him.  
 Rasputin sets the tone for the character’s unresponsiveness from the beginning 
through depictions of Ivan Petrovich’s interaction with his immediate environment. For 
example, he passes a ruined garden “without feeling.”82 The garden here serves as both 
evidence for the dilapidated conditions of his community and as a symbol for the 
broader violence against nature. The alignment of disintegrated community and broken 
nature underscores Rasputin’s view that environmental degradation and loss of 
communities were strongly associated. His character Ivan Petrovich feels incapable of 
addressing either problem. Not wanting anything, he was “[l]ike a man in his grave.”83 
His only way to evade death was to “overcome March, to conquer his last week with his 
last ounce of strength.”84 The metaphor of death and lifelessness underscores the picture 
of the intense exhaustion in his life.  
 Indeed, after pondering for some time he concludes that “perhaps the most 
important thing in life is for each person to stay headed in the right direction within his 
assigned place.”85 His conclusion marks the climax of his feelings of helplessness in 
face of the destruction of his community. Whether his assigned place comes from God, 
the government, or another higher authority is irrelevant in the story. What is more 
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important is that Ivan Petrovich feels that he does not have control over his own life. 
Regardless of his courage fighting in World War II for a better future for his homeland, 
he returned home to more suffering. Indeed, the home he was fighting to preserve was in 
a worse condition than when he left. Ivan laments that he and his fellow soldiers came 
“home from war only to die a natural death.”86 After the war, he faced famine, disease, 
and dislocation. The home for which he fought no longer existed and to add to his 
struggles, he had to scrounge for food. His statement that each person should not deviate 
from their predestined place in society stems from his life experiences of working for a 
better future only to encounter failure. He lost the will to strive for a brighter future and 
instead resigned himself to passively accept whatever life brings as his “assigned 
place.”87 This starts to explain his lack of initiative in fighting environmental 
degradation: the protagonist does not see his actions as having an effect. 
 A third reason for his minimal involvement in environmental protection 
movements appears as he is helping to stop the fire from spreading from one warehouse 
to another. In the process of removing materials and flammable objects from the 
building, Ivan Petrovich and his fellow community members find a Ural car in the 
storage houses of the county seat. This Ural car represents the promised economic 
development in the community, yet the authorities in the town had kept it secret and 
prevented the workers of the town from benefiting from its use. In this moment Ivan 
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realizes the deception of the leaders and factory heads in the town. The corruption at the 
local level ties into the lack of follow-through on the federal level in multiple ways. 
First, Ivan notes the lack of enforcement of deforestation regulations. Second, the forest 
service is severely understaffed, which contributes to the lack of deforestation policies. 
In Ivan Petrovich’s eyes, the laws are useless because of the corruption of the law 
enforcers.  
 This ties into his despair over the dirty water in the community, which in order to 
see as clean, “you must fasten some clever optical device over your eyes.”88 As he fights 
the fire, he flails his arms to signal that they need water. Just as clean water is scarce on 
a daily basis, Ivan Petrovich finds it impossible to acquire water in an emergency. Both 
the lack of potable water and the protagonist’s struggles to reach water to put out the fire 
contrast with the excess of water in the flooding of his hometown. There is never 
equilibrium of water in Ivan Petrovich’s life and he finds himself powerless to utilize 
water to his benefit. Just as Ivan Petrovich could do nothing to change the fate of his 
hometown from the overflowing Angara, he finds himself unable to do anything in the 
face of the fire that threatens the well-being of his new community. Feeling useless, he 
realizes that it was worthless for him to “have started flailing his arms in the first place 
for water.”89  
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 Flailing is the typical gesture of a drowning man and the character’s flailing of 
his arms alludes to the flooding of his hometown. This frantic gesture symbolizes 
desperation. If a man is unable to swim there is nothing he can do in the water but wave 
his arms: flailing is his last resort. In Ivan’s case, the desperation is to save his 
community. Rasputin draws a connection between the flooding of Ivan’s hometown and 
the fire in his new community with the character’s flailing gesture. Just as Ivan was 
powerless to stop the flooding of his hometown, he has no control over the fire raging in 
his new town. Flailing is also a call for help. As previously mentioned, if a man is 
drowning, he is unable to swim for himself for some reason. By flailing his arms, the 
drowning man has the hope of catching someone’s attention and being saved. In Ivan’s 
case, however, his flailing does no good. No one comes to rescue. In the context of the 
loss of his hometown, the government did little to support the community.  
 The protagonist's failure to save his hometown and helplessness to stop the fire 
symbolize the character's’ inability to demand stricter enforcement of water cleanliness 
and regulation of the forestry industry. Ivan Petrovich states that calling for the 
government to protect the environment would be “like some senile old man recalling the 
clean water of his childhood.”90 Nostalgia for the clean water of the past, which can also 
be seen as a symbol of the unblemished joy of childhood, does nothing to make the 
water of the present potable. In other words, there is no point dwelling on the past 
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because it will not change the protagonist's current situation for the better. The 
inadequate government support of everyday citizens like Ivan Petrovich renders 
community environmentalist initiatives ineffective and contributes to feelings of 
powerlessness to create change, which stifles the formation of natural protection groups 
in the first place.  
 The combination of government corruption, displacement, and lack of agency in 
his choice of profession contribute to Ivan Petrovich’s feelings of helplessness regarding 
natural protection. The ordinary characteristics of the protagonist, which makes him 
easily relatable,  suggest that Petrovich’s situation is also typical. Furthermore, 
Rasputin’s own familiarity with village life on the Angara and the displacement of 
logging communities because of the flooding of the river due to the construction of the 
Bratsk Dam makes the story credible. “The Fire,” thus, adds nuance to the analysis of 
freedom of environmentalism in the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods and beyond. 
The legal rights and freedoms that arose with relaxed policies following Stalin’s death 
proved ineffective in light of the social and cultural constraints on the people, 
particularly as a result of the economic struggles following World War II, heavy 
industrialization, and corruption.  
 We can see the relevance of Rasputin’s story to environmentalism in modern 
Russia by drawing parallels between the situation described in “The Fire” and case-
studies from the twenty-first century. Just as Ivan Petrovich depended on the logging 
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industry for survival, so too did workers in Baikalsk depend on the paper and pulp mill. 
When the mill closed in response to environmentalist protest, the majority of the 
residents of Baikalsk had no employment. President Vladimir Putin reopened the mill so 
that it would once again provide employment in the town. However, instead of funding 
the adjustments that the environmental standards of the time required, Putin changed the 
law and reopened the factory with the same equipment and pollution as before. This case 
study illustrates the continuation of two trends described in Rasputin’s story today. First, 
people’s economic dependence on local industries, i.e., the pulp mill or timber, inhibits 
environmentalism. Second, it exemplifies a lack of government support, i.e., Putin not 
giving Baikalsk residents financial support or pathways to work in another profession, 
and a disregard for environmental regulations. 
 
D) The Essays and Activism of Rasputin 
 Aside from his acclaimed repertoire of fiction, Rasputin also wrote a series of 
essays about Baikal. His illustration of the conditions of citizens in the Baikal region in 
his works of fiction contains environmentalist overtones. Taking a more direct approach, 
his nonfiction explicitly advocates for the protection of Lake Baikal and the natural 
wonders surrounding it. These essays solidified his role as a major voice in the 
environmentalist movement. The Siberian writer’s literary pieces highlight the 
nationalistic arguments for environmental protection through the perspective of villagers 
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witnessing the destruction of their traditional life; however, in his essays he frequently 
takes a moralistic approach. Rasputin argues that human beings do not hold the right to 
alter nature’s masterpiece. In his essays, of which we will analyze one here, Rasputin 
directly “calls on the public and on the authorities to stop the pollution before it is too 
late.”91 This perspective represents the intersection of the spaces for activism of 
environmental scientists and writers as well as a testimony to the “psychic import of this 
huge freshwater body to the spirit of the Russian people.”92 
 Rasputin uses juxtapositions of the quantitative measures of the lake, which 
scientists frequently use to argue Baikal’s worth, with references to the unquantifiable 
spiritual value of Baikal’s awe-inspiring “magic charm.”93 For example, he highlights 
the awesome qualities of the lake by comparing space exploration with hiking along 
Baikal’s shore. He likens the two-thousand kilometers of Baikal’s shoreline to the 
“hundreds of thousands of miles of empty outer space” and the vast distance between 
“here and the moon.”94 Similar to the United States during the Cold War, the USSR 
invested significant funds and money into space technologies. By comparing outer space 
and Lake Baikal, Rasputin reveals disappointment that the Soviet Union did not invest 
more thought, money, and time into the protection of the lake.  
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 Rasputin expresses why he believes that Baikal is worthy of greater attention. He 
asserts that even the mysteries of the moon could not match the “majestic, living beauty” 
of Baikal.95 With this comparison, Baikal becomes even bigger: by virtue of its 
qualitative characteristics, the quantitative length or depth of the lake surpasses anything 
outer space has to offer. Indeed, he states directly that “ultimately, it is possible to 
fathom its physical properties, its material qualities, everything in Baikal that can be 
measured and counted, but not its aesthetic mysteries and spiritual powers.”96 Rasputin 
effectively takes the emphasis off the hard data of Lake Baikal and its resources and 
leads his audience to see that the unfathomable qualities on Baikal demand its 
protection, perhaps even more so than any other measure of value. This strategy is 
important because often industries will think of how to use the lake’s resources 
quantitatively: acres of forest, gallons of water, population of fish, etc. The quantitative 
measures of value of the lake are therefore connected to the exploitation of Baikal’s 
resources. By de-emphasizing these quantitative measures and instead highlighting the 
qualitative ones, Rasputin demonstrates the untouchable values of Baikal. He directs his 
audience to appreciate the spiritual value of Baikal, which cannot be measured 
quantitatively.  
 This raises another question: Who is Rasputin’s audience in this essay? Whom is 
he trying to convince to protect Baikal? What people or organizations does he see as 
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participants in the environmental movement that could protect Baikal? The full essay 
was originally published in Russia as “Lake Baikal Before My Eyes” in 2003. The work 
was intended for the average Soviet citizen as demonstrated by his choice to take a 
lyrical, poetic tone instead of a sterile, academic one. For example, he liberally utilizes 
such spiritual phrases as “miracle,” “echo of grace,” and “uplifting spirit.”97 There are 
no technical references or jargon in the essay. Overall, his diction makes the piece 
accessible to most audiences. Thanks to Gerald Mikkelson at the University of Kansas, a 
friend and colleague of Rasputin, the essay has been able to reach an anglophone 
audience. Mikkelson translated Rasputin’s work and published excerpts of it in “Lake 
Baikal: An Evocation.”  
 While this allowed a broader public to hear Rasputin’s pleas for Baikal, his 
original work relies on the reader’s knowledge of the Sacred Sea. For example, he uses 
the pronoun “we” when describing the beautiful sights on Baikal, but also does not go 
into specific descriptive detail of the views found there. If one had not been to Baikal, 
the chilling beauty of the lake would still come through with his writing. However, 
without having visited it would be impossible to capture the feelings Rasputin tries to 
convey. A master of literature and descriptive prose, Rasputin has the skills to paint an 
accurate picture of Baikal in the readers mind if he chooses to include details. The 
absence of specific descriptive details, therefore, seems deliberate. This suggests that he 
imagines his audience to be local residents, natives to the region, captivated visitors, or 
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others familiar with the lake. The list of those who could potentially identify with 
Rasputin’s rhetoric includes anyone who has a personal connection to Baikal––––factory 
workers and elite alike. He calls everyone, of all classes and professions, to action and 
argues that “Baikal offers us room to grow and develop” to find an escape from “this 
artificial world,” but only if it is treated “with care.”98   
 Unfortunately, the writer does not provide specific actions that people should or 
could take in order to protect the environment. Instead his writings reveal the problems 
of environmental degradation without offering methods for the everyday citizen to make 
a change, e.g., recycling in their homes, not littering, boycotting products made with 
polluting machinery, etc. Rather, Rasputin’s writings and articles compel individuals to 
involve themselves in already existing movements and push for politicians to make 
changes in regulations that would protect the lake and its connected waterways.  
  Valentin Rasputin’s writing, life on Baikal, and environmentalism give great 
insight into the potential for and reasons behind environmentalism in the Baikal region 
during the second half of the twentieth century. His short stories focus on village life 
around Baikal, particularly on the Angara River. Portraying the damages to 
communities, he draws from his family’s personal experience after the flooding caused 
by the Bratsk dam, which makes his characters and stories believable. His essays evoke 
the beauty of Baikal and urge the reader to take into consideration the unquantifiable 
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value of the Pearl of Siberia. Rasputin directly acknowledges the spiritual gifts the 
nature of his homeland has given him. He reflects that the “nature of our native region is 
engraved in our souls forever. For example, whenever I experience something akin to 
prayer, I see myself on the banks of the old Angara River, which no longer exists, 
alongside my native village of Atalanka, the islands across the way, and the sun setting 
beyond the opposite bank.”99  
 Just as he sees the shores of the Angara as a source of spiritual healing, he 
implies that those responsible for the destruction of the waterways will face 
condemnation from a higher being. He states that “when reflecting on the actions of 
today’s ‘river-rerouting’... it would not be a bad idea for [the modernizers] to know that 
not everything is forgiven at the time of death.”100 In this statement he equates the 
destruction of nature to a grave sin when he alludes to judgement by God “at the time of 
death.”101 While the planners directing the water projects in Russia are sinners in 
Rasputin’s eyes, he also charges the people with the responsibility to protect the sacred 
resources around Baikal. In his interview with People he reiterated that the openness in 
Gorbachev’s glasnost’ and perestroika provided the opportunity for real change but only 
if the people took responsibility for the mistakes already made. He states that "this 
policy of openness is needed to name the people responsible for past mistakes," but also 
insists that people are accountable to the lake: "Remember, we had openness once before 
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with Khrushchev, but things didn't progress too far because we didn't want to take 
responsibility for all the mistakes."102 
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Chapter Four: Chernobyl, Gorbachev, and Political Reforms  
 
 In the 1980s nature protection became an increasingly public effort.103 During 
the Khrushchev Thaw media debates focusing on environmentalism ensued over the 
construction of the Baikalsk paper mill and brought on heightened public participation. 
This spirit of public environmental activism was revived twenty years later. In the 1980s 
the national focus on environmentalism shifted to nuclear energy following the 
explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear plant. Environmentalism and politics were linked 
like never before. Within the new climate of social openness that came with 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost’, environmentalism gained new prominence in 
political conversations. In fact, not only did the Chernobyl event inform ecological 
movements, but it also shaped broader social, political, and economic policies. 
Environmental issues came to the center of political discussion as Gorbachev used the 
explosion at Chernobyl as a platform for broader reforms in policies. Consequently, 
Gorbachev’s time in power saw heightened discussions of natural resource protection 
within the government and also set the stage for international participation to save 
Baikal. 
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A) Chernobyl and the Beginning of Gorbachev’s Reforms 
 Frequently, catastrophic events spur political action and societal demand for 
change. These events hold importance both because of the circumstances of the incident 
itself and also because of the societal pressures leading up to it. For example, in the 
United States, scholars frequently reference the 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio 
as a formative event for the environmental movement. This was not the first time that 
flames had appeared on the Cleveland river, nor did it “incur maximum damages or 
fatally wound any citizen.”104 However, the incident did receive the greatest media 
attention and led to Congress passing the National Environment Protection Act because 
of the emphasis on sanitation and waste dumping at the time.105  
 The explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine in 1986 has numerous 
parallels to the Cuyahoga fire in that it served as the final tipping point and triggered 
political action. Unlike the Cuyahoga incident, however, the explosion of Chernobyl led 
to thirty fatalities immediately following the event and a plethora of other health 
complications and the forced relocation of residents in the years after the explosion.106 
Perhaps because of the gravity of the incident, the Chernobyl catastrophe fueled 
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Gorbachev’s glasnost’ and perestroika, which in turn created new opportunities for the 
environmental movement.  
 In a speech at a Politburo meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, blamed the Chernobyl catastrophe on the “‘spirit 
of servility, clannishness, and persecution of independent thinkers’” that pervaded the 
USSR.107 With this, Gorbachev asked citizens to take part in meetings to make 
suggestions for institutional change. In the same year (1986), Gorbachev proposed 
decommissioning all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and called for the spread of 
glasnost’ ––– freedom of speech, press and opinion.108 Following this speech, 
Gorbachev’s  perestroika, the restructuring of the economic and political policies of the 
Soviet Union, and glasnost’ developed. Both glasnost’ and perestroika are considered 
influential programs in the ultimate fall of communism and transition to democracy. 
 Both provided a new space for social organization, including environmental 
organizations. For example, petitions against the development of nuclear energy were 
distributed and signed, a testament to the influence of the Chernobyl tragedy on the 
focus of environmental movements. Aside from issues pertaining to nuclear energy, 
Gorbachev’s glasnost’ and perestroika policies encouraged environmental activists to 
rally around a variety of causes to demand government response: river diversion, 
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pollution, and health concerns in the wake of environmental degradation.109 Thus, the 
environmental movement transformed into an outlet to express dissatisfaction with 
Soviet environmental policy and ultimately, the Soviet regime itself. The political 
turmoil both fueled and allowed for the heightened environmental activism and for that 
reason, the waves of political tensions coincided with periods of intense 
environmentalism. Laura Henry marks the period between 1989 and 1991 as the time of 
peak environmentalist activity.  
 
B) An Overview of Glasnost’ and Perestroika and the Trends in Environmentalism 
  The literal meaning of perestroika is “restructuring.” It was exactly that: the 
transformation of the social, political, and economic systems in the country. The English 
equivalent of glasnost’ is “openness” and refers to Gorbachev’s policy reform. To be 
clear, these terms refer to two distinct changes under Gorbachev; however, media 
frequently uses the two jointly because of the significance both had for the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. For that reason, we will refer to the two reforms together, although we 
also acknowledge that they are distinct sociopolitical movements. Perestroika and 
glastnost’ had similar effects on the environmental movement and therefore, a cursory 
overview of the trends of Gorbachev’s sociopolitical transformations is necessary in 
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order to understand the changes of environmentalist movements on Baikal during the 
late 1980s. 
 During perestroika and glasnost’ Gorbachev emphasized the inclusion of 
progressive and dynamic personnel through his demokratizatsiia (democratization). 
While he wanted to keep the one-party system in place, he pushed for multi-candidate 
elections of leaders and officials at the local level. His hope was that these elected 
officials would carry out his institutional and policy reforms in each county, city, or 
region.110 These changes would decrease the centralized control of the Party and allow 
for greater participation of the public in political decisions, including environmental 
ones. Gorbachev encouraged this involvement of the citizens in environmental decisions 
in the form of regional councils, which led to new forums for public participation. The 
same political transformation that opened up discussion of environmental issues within 
regional administrations also formally acknowledged the role of leaders of 
environmental causes, including those on Baikal, particularly writers and natural 
scientists. Adapted from a table in Oleg Yanitsky’s paper “The Shift in Environmental 
Debates in Russia,” the following table (table II) illustrates the shifts in environmental 
debates and the actors involved:111 
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Table II: Trends in Environmental Debates 
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We can glean a few key trends from the table that align with the political 
changes that Gorbachev instigated. The types of participants highlight the spaces for 
environmentalism at the time. Natural scientists and writers play a crucial role in the 
1980s with natural scientists’ central role in environmental debates continuing until 
2006. In more recent years, however, we see the increased involvement of organizers, 
activists, and members of non-governmental groups. While the public sector was a part 
of the movement in each of these periods, the increased number of previously limited 
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modes of participation, e.g., environmental activism within NGOs, speaks to the 
increased institutionalization of environmentalism. As the preservation of natural 
resources gained importance in Gorbachev’s politics, former leaders of the 
environmentalist countercultural movement became public figures. This official 
recognition of environmentalist leaders speaks to the greater openness within the 
government to the movement. Furthermore, Baikal directly benefited from this increased 
openness. Looking at Table II, we see that the environmental movement in the 1980s 
focused on Lake Baikal with writers and natural scientists leading the way. 
 In 1989, environmentalists took advantage of the political reforms when 
candidates Briusova, Lemenshev, and Shipunov all ran as nationalist 
environmentalists.112 Unfortunately, none of the three won. Briusova charged their loss 
“with a pattern of discrimination on the part of the Electoral Commissions, ‘insofar as it 
is now known that patriots of Russia did not make it into the ‘Moscow group’ of the 
Congress’” who had the most power and influence.113 While the shift to a multi-
candidate system was still vulnerable to corruption and Party meddling, the openness to 
the public’s opinions had an influence on the effectiveness of environmental campaigns 
as it created greater tolerance for public discourse. Although they failed to gain a seat in 
office, by the end of the 1980s leaders of the ecological movement “were able to 
develop and implement a number of key action laws, which later formed the basis of a 
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relatively modern structure of government agencies responsible for the conservation and 
sustainable use of its resources.”114 
 With an open window for the discussion of issues pertaining to the environment, 
Baikal came to the center of media attention. The most publicized environmental issues 
during the perestroika period had to do with “water: the consequences of dam 
construction on rivers and valleys,” and plans to divert north flowing tributaries of 
Baikal to central Asia for to irrigate cotton fields.115 Under Gorbachev’s reforms, natural 
scientists could show their opposition to such projects. Additionally, with the openness 
of glasnost’ magazines were able to publish more information about the powerful Soviet 
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management.116 This former KGB department 
took responsibility for the construction of dams and canals, including those on Baikal. In 
this way, glasnost’ allowed the public to be educated on the links between the Gulags 
and dam construction that had started under Stalin. Overall, glasnost’ led to a more 
informed public who would, theoretically, have greater motivation to act to protect the 
environment. The emphasis on issues of water and Baikal in the early years dissipated 
and articles began to appear on a variety of environmental causes: food contamination, 
sources of pollution, etc. By the end of the 1980s, according to an interview with 
                                                
114 Экологическое Движение в России: Сборник научных Трудов. Санкт–Петербург 1999, 35. 
115 "The Changing Face of Environmentalism in the Soviet Union. (Includes related article on Soviet 
Union pollution) (interview)". 1990. Environment. 32 (2), 5. 
116 “The Changing Face of Environmentalism in the Soviet Union” 5. 
 
Korsgard 81 
scientific researchers from Moscow State University, coverage of environmental issues 
was rather good overall.117 
 Other important trends during perestroika include increasing economic and 
political connections with foreign companies, governments, and organizations. In May 
of 1988, the Law of Cooperatives came into existence. This policy permitted private 
ownership of companies in a multitude of sectors, including in foreign trade.118 As we 
will discuss later, international connections became increasingly important for 
environmentalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. Support from abroad became the 
main source of funding for prominent NGOs on Baikal, i.e., The Great Baikal Trail, The 
Baikal Wave, etc. The changes that came with perestroika and glasnost’ significantly 
altered the dynamics in society, trade, and politics of Russia at large.  
 
C) Gorbachev and Environmental Politics 
 Gorbachev revitalized ecological decision-making with institutions modeled 
after the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States. These government 
agencies gave formal forums for regional input on environmental issues. Under 
Gorbachev’s direction in January of 1988 the Council of Ministries and the Central 
Committee established the State Committee for Environmental Protection 
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(Goskompriroda), which replaced “a hogdepodge of state committees and ministries that 
formerly shared responsibility for environmental policy.”119 This system used the 
structure of the EPA in which regional branches coordinated with a central agency to 
enforce environmental regulations. However, the Goskompriroda differed from the EPA 
in the way the institution was split into sections. Instead of dividing itself by issue areas, 
i.e, water and air, its categories emphasized comprehensive control and regulation. The 
divisions included the following: 1) Organizational and Economic Questions, 2) 
Ecological Expertise, 3) International, 4) Scientific and Technological Progress and 
Norms, 5) Control Inspection.120 
 At the same time that Goskompriroda developed, the Supreme Soviet also 
underwent reforms. In 1988 at the nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party, 
Gorbachev announced plans to transfer power from the party’s highest organs and the 
Council of Ministries. The Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet 
together became a working legislature elected by the congress. Since the 1920s the 
Supreme Soviet had been elected to work eight to ten months per a year. In the 1980s 
environmental platforms for the congress became increasingly common with Valentin 
Rasputin among the most outspoken.121  
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 The key transformations in the government structure for the environmental 
movement on Baikal include a formalized forum for public input in ecological issues 
and a new openness to the international community. The new structure of 
Goskompriroda, in which regional residents had sub-committees or branches of federal 
institutions, ideally facilitated the exchange of concerns from a local level to the national 
leaders who had the power to enact laws across Russia through the Congress of People’s 
Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, division three of Goskompriroda 
focuses on international environmental protection initiatives and partnerships. While the 
title of the division does not specify the types of international collaboration nor the focus 
of the international committee, its existence represents the increase in international 
conversations in which the Soviet Union was participating under Gorbachev and set the 
stage for the role of foreign environmental organizations moving forward.  
 
D) Political Reforms in the Baikal Region 
 Particularly on Baikal, local environmentalists and the international community 
took part in discussion on the lake and efforts to protect it. Indeed, Baikal took center 
stage during the 1980s in environmental debates (see table II). The transformation in 
environmental administration had a significant effect in the Baikal region, and many of 
the initiatives to protect the lake stemmed from the new framework of environmental 
protection under Gorbachev. As Table II exhibits, the period of Gorbachev’s perestroika 
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and glasnost’ witnessed an emphasis on the Baikal region with the “Campaign to Save 
Lake Baikal.”122 The focus on water starting in the 1980s demonstrates the lasting 
impact of the transformation of Russia’s waterways under Stalin. Although the Gulag 
labor camps decreased following Stalin’s death, construction of hydroelectric power 
stations, dams, and other such industrial developments continued to negatively impact 
the waterways. The fact that water issues were at the center of the environmental 
movement in the 1980s testifies to a continued response to the legacy of Stalin’s 
industrialization along the rivers, lakes, and seas of the nation. Furthermore, the links 
between industrialization and threats to bodies of water continued into the twenty-first 
century. In 2006, Lake Baikal again garnered attention for the proposal of the 
construction of a East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline that would have come within 
800 meters of Baikal and put the lake at risk of degradation from accidental oil spills.123 
The reoccurrence of Baikal-related activism reinforces the importance of Baikal in 
broader environmental debates in Russia, especially during the Gorbachev period when 
new policies and regulations concerning natural resources were developed.  
 The new Goskompriroda played an important role in environmentalism in the 
Baikal region under Gorbachev. In the late 1980s, the Irkutsk Oblast’ became a model 
for sustainable development at the local level and a demonstration for the potential of 
Goskompriroda. The example in the Baikal region as a “model of a local initiative” 
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showed the great potential of the new system, the experience of environmentalist activist 
for Baikal “also reinforced the conclusions that regional governments still need less 
interference from Moscow and more money to fulfill their environmental protection 
responsibilities.”124 The new system of ecological law-making and deliberation 
established with Goskompriroda’s regional branches and the reforms to the Supreme 
Soviet allowed for the enactment of the 1988 ecological certification law. This law 
required a  “passport” for the 150 largest enterprises in the oblast’. The passport 
included three elements: 1) A profile of the enterprise’s energy use; 2) A comparison to 
the must up-to-date technology in the world for the industry of the applying company; 3) 
A review of the technological improvements that would contribute to conservation 
efforts. With the proper regulation of this new passport system, the industries of the 
Baikal region would have had to be much more diligent in managing their emissions, 
which would have led to benefits including cleaner air and water.  
 Unfortunately, these initiatives faced certain challenges. First, the regional 
Goskompriroda branch in Irkutsk had too few staff members for the task. In the example 
of the passport system, there were not enough experts to review enterprises thoroughly 
and consequently, there was a lack of accountability. Likewise, technological resources 
were limited in the region both in terms of the experts who would implement the 
approval process as well as experts to assist in the improvement of factory technologies. 
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Resources were also limited in terms of the physical construction materials and money. 
The certification process was only successful in ten enterprises on Baikal because of a 
lack of money and technology that prevented them from meeting the objectives. 
Furthermore, the advantage of the devolution of power from Moscow in allowing 
Irkutsk to exercise regional self-financing and have control over natural resources was 
often countered by a lack of local expertise.  
 These challenges were not particular to Baikal. In fact, many of the problems of 
the implementation of Goskompriroda at the local level stemmed from tensions at the 
national level. Many critics charge that  “Goskompriroda organs are led by apparatchiks 
who got their positions through connections with powerful officials rather than because 
of their qualifications.”125 The heads of Goskompriroda often received their positions 
based on favors or personal connections in Moscow and not on their knowledge of 
ecological issues. Additionally, the central office of Goskompriroda also faced a dearth 
of monetary and human resources. Only 500 people worked in the national office with a 
twenty million dollar budget, which is minimal compared to the United State’s four 
billion dollar budget for the EPA at the time. 
 Overall, no legal parameters for the Goskompriroda existed. The legislature 
underwent transformation at the same time as the development of the Goskompriroda 
and so “legislation defining the functions and powers of the Goskompriroda” had not yet 
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appeared by 1990, over two years since its initial founding.126 The lack of clarity in 
procedures and legal definition given by the Supreme Soviet for the Goskompriroda can 
be seen as a result of the process of restructuring. New personnel had to be hired and 
systems updated, which takes considerable time. It is possible that, had the Soviet Union 
not collapsed, the institution would have been able to recover from the initial difficulties 
and fulfill the potential that the Irkutsk Oblast’ demonstrated. The fact remains that the 
Soviet Union did fall and the tensions between a dearth of monetary of human resources 
and lack of regional administration authority continue into the 2000s. While the 
reorganization of the government under Gorbachev had mixed results for the 
environmental movement on Baikal, the openness to activism of local citizens did foster 
powerful citizen-driven movements. 
 
E) Citizens’ Movements and Groups 
 Because of the uncertainty of federal organizations pressure groups and non-
governmental organizations were crucial for environmental policy at the local level in 
the Irkutsk Oblast’. The use of media proved successful in a few instances in protecting 
the environment. Just as the public had taken up debates over the construction of the 
Baikalsk Paper and Pulp Mill, environmental advocates again turned to the press in 
order to force the diversion of a pipeline planned to go to the Irkut River in 1987. Local 
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scientists wrote letters to newspapers to argue against the proposed pipeline. Soon other 
prominent figures and local peoples fought for the cause. Gorbachev’s glasnost’ did not 
mean that these activists did not face serious consequences for speaking out. While there 
was more room to criticize certain aspects of Soviet society, activists faced “risk of 
dismissal, imprisonment and intimidations from the authorities.”127 In this case, it was a 
combination of decreased risk for protesting and a renewed urgency for environmental 
protection, perhaps encouraged by the conversations happening in Goskompriroda, that 
drove 100,000 people to sign a petition to the Central Committee in Moscow demanding 
that the pipeline be dropped. In the end the movement was successful and the pipeline 
project was abandoned.  
 Many of the same participants of the movement in protest of the pipeline project 
formed the Baikal Fund two years later. The Baikal Fund, which had members from the 
All-Russian Nature Conservation Society and the Siberian Department of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences, was “perhaps the most important pressure group in the area.”128 
Valentin Rasputin was also a member of the Baikal Fund and Gorbachev appointed him 
to the presidential council. Rasputin spoke to the Soviet leader at length about the 
problems of Baikal. As a result of their conversations, Gorbachev sent a commission to 
Baikal in 1989 to investigate. 
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 In both of these instances, local pressure groups had relative success in getting 
national attention for Baikalian issues. At the same time, during Gorbachev’s time in 
power there was also increased collaboration among the international community to 
protect the lake. In September of 1990 the First International Ecological Conference was 
held. This is just one example of the international participation in environmental 
protection that appeared at the time in the form of conferences, multinational 
organizations, and foreign financial support for environmental protection.  
 One of the potential ways to solve the problems of Baikal was to obtain a 
UNESCO World Heritage Area designation. As we will discuss in greater depth later, 
the process for this designation was rigorous and set the standards for international 
collaboration, local buy-in, and parameters for protection. Though not in direct response 
to the efforts to achieve UNESCO World Heritage Area (WHA) status, the new 
openness to international organizations and the trends that encouraged the pursuit of 
WHA designation, resulted in the formation of international environmental 
organizations focusing on Baikal. Not only does international support continue to be 
important for environmental protection in the region today, but many of the 
organizations that were founded in the 1980s continue to fight for Baikal. For example, 
the Tahoe-Baikal Institute arose from a 1988 cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
the United States with the vision “to bring together young people from many countries 
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to study and discuss world problems, including environmental issues, and experience the 
wilderness areas in the vicinity of these two lakes.” 129 
 Overall Gorbachev’s reforms offered hope to the environmental movement, 
especially on Baikal. At the same time, the challenges that Gorbachev’s new 
environmental management structure faced in implementation reappeared after the fall 
of the Soviet Union. 
                                                




Chapter Five: The Fall of Communism and Changes with Yeltsin  
 
A) Overview of the Fall of Communism  
 The freedom to express their opinions that Gorbachev gave to the people of the 
Soviet Union did help to relieve the stagnation that had plagued the country prior to 
Gorbachev’s rise to power; however, it also allowed people to voice their discontent 
with Gorbachev himself and with the state of the Soviet Union. The sequence of events 
leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union and the factors that led groups to protest are 
complex and what the key movements in the disintegration of the USSR are depends on 
the perspective of individual telling the history. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
started in outlying satellite states. In 1987 the government of  Estonia demanded 
autonomy. After the initial protests in Estonia, numerous other movements appeared 
throughout the Soviet Union. These expressions of discontent presented a challenge for 
Gorbachev’s glasnost’. While he did not want to stop the movements completely, he 
knew that if the protests continued there would be significant challenges for the Soviet 
Union. When populations in the Armenian-populated autonomous region of Nagorno-
Karabakh in the Republic of Azerbaijan pushed to secede from the Soviet Union, the 
Gorbachev administration denied their request. This led to a “violent territorial dispute, 
eventually degenerating into an all-out war which continues unabated until the present 
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day.”130 The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was the opening of the “‘pandora’s box’” in 
terms of demands for autonomy.131 Following this incident, nationalist movements 
emerged in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belorussia, and the Central Asian republics. 
This significantly weakened the power in Moscow as the Soviet government could no 
longer rely on the support of the regional republics.  
 In Russia, particularly in Moscow, the failing economy fueled the people’s 
growing rage at the Soviet government. Most products were imported from abroad, but 
there were not enough exports providing revenue for Russians to purchase all the goods 
they needed and/or wanted. The discontent came to a climax in August of 1991. In a 
final attempt to save the Soviet Union, “hard-line” communists kidnapped Gorbachev 
and proclaimed on national television that he was too ill to continue governing. This 
attempted coup d’etat led to mass protests in Moscow and Leningrad. When the coup 
organizers tried to pacify the crowds, “the soldiers themselves rebelled, saying that they 
could not fire on their fellow countrymen.”132 The communist leaders of the coup 
realized that they could not overcome the power of the protesters, and following this 
failed coup, the Soviet Union collapsed completely. Soon Boris Yeltsin rose to power in 
Russia as the first president of the Russian Federation. He, like the leaders of the other 
                                                
130 "Fall of the Soviet Union." Cold War Museum. Accessed March 25, 2013. 
http://www.coldwar.org/articles/90s/fall_of_the_soviet_union.asp, 1.  
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 3. 
 
Korsgard 93 
former Soviet states, was charged with the task of reorganizing the government, 
economy, and infrastructure of his country.  
 The move to a capitalist economy after the fall of the USSR and the formation of 
the Russian Federation had significant influence on the decision-making process for 
ecological issues and the participation of citizens in efforts to protect the environment. 
The transition inhibited local participation in environmental issues, yet the opportunities 
for support from abroad grew as the former Soviet Union reached out to the international 
community to protect the natural wonders of Russia.  
 
B) Regional Organization Structure: Back-Tracking from the Gorbachev Days 
 The transformation of the political and economic systems set the stage for the 
relationship between regional ecological organizations, such as those in the Baikal 
Region, and the power in Moscow. Moving into the 1990s regional organizational 
structure somewhat followed the structure the Soviet times; however, the general 
process of political democratization and changes in forms of property ownership and 
land stewardship “had a highly significant influence on the structure and function of 
networks of regional ecological politics (i.e. ecopolitics).”133 As a result, the provincial 
ecological organizations in the Irkutsk Oblast and the Republic of Buryatia faced uneven 
and complicated power dynamics that inhibited environmental regulation. The regional 
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authorities charged with enforcing environmental regulations were caught in a power 
struggle between local citizens and interest groups, i.e., environmental nongovernmental 
organizations, factory owners, and the federal government. While under the law, these 
local administrations had the power to demand adherence to environmental protection 
policies, the federal government did not give them sufficient resources to do so and as a 
result many of the efforts to enforce the environmental laws failed. These power 
conflicts that regional administrations faced continue to shape the environmental 
policies and decisions to this day.  
 The networking structure of ecological leadership is hierarchical, stemming from 
Moscow. In theory, having federal backing gives regional governments greater 
opportunities for funding and reinforcement of laws and regulations. However, the 
hierarchies of power between regions and the federal government do not align with the 
internal hierarchies of regional governments. The regional administration takes the 
responsibility for distributing resources to ecological branches and local groups. Matters 
became more complicated between 1989 and 1993 as the legislative and executive 
branches established councils meant to serve at every level of society. Through these 
councils even the “lowest level” of society could have a voice in ecological decisions.134  
 In 1993 these organs of direct representation of the population were dissolved. 
While this was effective in centralizing the control of resources, the federal government 
still lacked the complete ownership of natural resources that it had enjoyed in the Soviet 
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Union. This reflects Soviet times when leaders of the party and state tried to” 
rationalize” the structure of decision making in all spheres of society. As a consequence 
of the new centralized control, when environmental issues made it on the agenda, they 
followed the bureaucratic decision-making structure of  “the existing party-state 
machine.”135 This decision-making structure did not facilitate quick action. A lower 
level official would first review proposals for environmental initiatives. If it passed that 
step it would continue to be passed up until a higher-level official could determine the 
proposal’s fate. Although there were multi-candidate elections, favoritism still played a 
role and so one group tended to dominate the political sphere. If the proposal fit the 
party’s needs, then a decision would be made more quickly. However, if the proposal 
did not seem advantageous to the politicians reading it, then it would take a long time 
for a decision to be made, if the proposal was even read. The inefficient ecological 
decision-making process exemplifies the detriments of the consolidation of control over 
regional resources.  
 During this same period three processes happened concurrently, two of which 
hold particular relevance to Baikal. First, conflict arose between the federal center and 
the regional administration. Second, power struggles unfolded between old elites, from 
the Soviet period, and new elites, those who profited from the shifting of economic 
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distribution as the Soviet Union fell to become wealthy and powerful.136 Regionally, 
governors sought to additionally strengthen their place in power, especially when 
political positions were decided by public elections. The main issue with these conflicts 
is that they move the focus away from the basic environmental consequences of rapid 
industrialization and instead dwell on profit. In an effort to appeal to their constituents, 
political candidates looked for quick ways to generate jobs in the region. Employment 
was an especially important topic for politicians after the fall of the Soviet Union as the 
economy struggled to recover from the sudden switch from communism to capitalism. 
Creating jobs meant the opening of factories and support of other polluting industries. 
As in the United States, businesses and politicians in Russia frequently do not consider 
the “true costs” of  certain environmentally degrading actions. As a result, unless leading 
businesses see financial benefit from taking Baikal’s holistic health into account, the 
true costs of industry are disregarded.  
 On a positive note, in the Republic of Buryatia the regional administrations and 
the federal government found a potential solution to some of these conflicts. By power-
sharing, the regional administration and the federal government made an agreement to 
“establish conditions for economic activities in the water basin of Lake Baikal.”137 
These economic activities include mining, forestry, and other environmentally 
detrimental industries. By establishing regulations and guidelines for these economic 
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activities, the government could both open new jobs and protect the environment to 
some extent. This collaboration is essential because without federal support it is much 
more difficult for environmental organizations to gain access to the necessary resources 
to protect the environment in the long term simply because they do not have the political 
influence of wealthy industries, such as timber. 
   At the same time, decision-making within government agencies was “purely 
directive, it does not leave room for regional self-organization or, at least, coordination 
of forces between formal organizations and societal movements.”138 Similar to the 
highly centralized bureaucracy of the Soviet Union, provincial administrations at the 
turn of the twenty-first century and today depended on the federal government for funds 
and resources. As previously mentioned, the regional hierarchies of power continuously 
faced pressure from two sides: first, from the top, from the federal government; and 
second, from the bottom, from the local councils, demanding help and resources.139  
 This pressure on regional environmental administrations from the bottom and top 
could encourage creative solutions. However, we must consider the individuals who 
have control in the regional administration and the types of solutions for which they will 
push. Because the executive branch dominates over the legislative branch of 
government, mayors run the committees on nature from various cities. While 
governmental leadership helps to reinforce regulations, the formation of nature 
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protection policies requires experts in the field to ensure that the policies are effective 
and fair. Those who serve on the committees, however, have “close to zero” ecological 
education.140 In the Baikal region, we see the lack of emphasis on expertise in ecological 
matters even today with the Baikalsk example. When deciding to reopen the factory, 
Vladimir Putin examined the water from a Mir-1 submarine with his naked eye. While 
the expedition’s main purpose was to show off the politician’s softer side, he made some 
illustrative statements about the health of Lake Baikal. Putin “expressed some surprise 
about how murky the water was.”141 However, he also stated that “‘the water, of course, 
is clean from an ecological point of view.’” 142 Putin’s assertion is clearly false in light 
of publications by respected scientists illustrating the increase of dangerous chemicals 
and water temperature. 
 Leading up to 1993 when, as previously mentioned, regional representation of 
the public in the form of councils and committees came to an end, the regional 
legislative branches were also losing their power. This year marked the dawn of what 
historian Laura Henry has titled a “super presidential system” in which the State Duma 
and the Federation Council were weak relative to the executive power.143 The executive 
power, thus, had ultimate control of resources with few channels to them available to the 
public. Likewise, personal ties meant more than political programs. 
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  The industries that have proven to bring in the greatest income, therefore, also 
receive the most favoritism from Moscow due to the personal ties of industry leaders. 
This includes the timber industry, mining, and hydroelectric dams in the Baikal region. 
Unfortunately, most of these industries do not conduct their work in environmentally 
responsible ways. The costs of implementing pollution-decreasing technologies are too 
high from the point of view of the government officials and investors who would 
support them. As in the Baikalsk example, the more economical decision in the eyes of 
central power is to change or disregard the regulations and continue work as before, 
regardless of the effects on the environment.  
 The hierarchy of decision-making for ecological problems overlooks the key 
ingredient in effective environmental protection: support at the local level. 
Environmental scholar, I. I. Dumova writing on Baikal sees collaboration between 
regional administration and the local populations as crucial for environmental 
protection. Dumova argues that attempts to preserve the quality of the environment will 
be doomed to failure if they are not supported regionally by partnerships between local 
governments and non-governmental organizations, businesses, and citizens. She 
explains that the strength of the regional administration is crucial because it can help to 
align the distinct groups of the region and their respective interests for the utilization of 
the natural resources. Particularly, the local government can play a large role in 
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mediating between demands for economic development and calls to protect the natural 
resources.144 
 The lack of agency of local administrations in the Baikal region and the stripping 
of the power of local committees was extremely detrimental for the protection of the 
environment. Environmentalism must exist at all levels of society so that stakeholders at 
each level have a say in the ecological decisions. When the government eliminated the 
structures for local collaboration on environmental issues, it also lost the support at the 
regional level, which is, as Dumova asserts, necessary for the success of environmental 
protection. 
 
C) Changes to the Lifestyle in Siberia 
 Aside from creating changes to the hierarchy of decision making, the decline of 
the Soviet Union had an influence on the everyday lives of the citizens in Siberia. 
Changes in the living conditions of individuals in the Baikal region influenced their 
priorities and ability to participate in environmental activism. The changes to the 
Siberian lifestyle that came along with democratization and the transition to capitalism 
had the potential to both positively and negatively affect the involvement of local 
communities in environmentalist efforts. 
 One of the major factors impacting lifestyle is income as it influences anything 
from leisure activities to shopping habits. Income also affects an individuals’ 
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participation in environmentalist activities because investing in environmental protection 
efforts requires time, money, and social capital. The country experienced hyperinflation 
that piqued between 1992 and 1993. Issues of escalated inflation continued throughout 
Yeltsin’s time in office and personal savings were wiped out. GDP fell by a dramatic 
40%, while at the same time state spending on welfare, health, education, and culture 
dropped by 37.5%, forcing Russian citizens to spread fewer funds to cover greater 
costs.145 
 Between 1972 and 1993 a study performed by sociologist V.A. Artemov found 
that between 1987 and 1993 there was a stark increase of people not earning “enough for 
the bare necessities.”146 Specifically, in 1987 only 8% of respondents living in the 
countryside reported that they did not have enough income for their basic necessities, 
which jumped to 41% of respondents living in the countryside in 1993.147 City dwellers 
also reported not having enough to meet the basic needs, rising to 14% in 1990. 
Furthermore, the blue collar industries of Siberia were the least developed and 
consequently, the poorest populations became poorer. These are also the workers most 
directly involved with environmentally degrading industries in factories, such as the 
Baikalsk paper and pulp mill. These economic struggles were not isolated to the 
transitory period. Indeed, Laura Henry asserts that the impoverishment of the Russian 
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people during this period led to the 1998 financial crisis. For environmentalism this 
would mean a prolonged period of struggle.148 
 During the transition to the new political and economic system citizens spent 
significantly more time doing housework and taking care of personal needs while also 
devoting less time relaxing outdoors. Between 1976 and 1990 four percent more 
urbanite respondents reported that their additional free time would be dedicated to 
housework and three percent reported time spent on taking care of medical or other 
needs.149 This shift is logical considering that during the Soviet period the government 
provided healthcare and other services. As Russia transitioned to capitalism and a free-
market economy, the burden of these formerly public services, e.g., medical insurance, 
landed on the individual citizens. As a result the families’ “ability to provide themselves 
with food and material and domestic services has taken on considerable significance in 
connection with the decline in real income obtained from the social sector.”150 In other 
words, real income declined even further as individuals had to look to the private sector 
for formerly state provided services. Artemov’s study found an increase in respondents 
reporting multiple jobs, which the study hypothesizes supplement their incomes to pay 
for the additional services.151 
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 Siberian citizens lost both time and funds to invest in leisure activities, which 
includes participating in ecological protection initiatives. The decrease in real income 
and time most likely inhibited the Baikalian residents’ participation in events to promote 
protection of Lake Baikal organized by local non-profits and nongovernmental 
organizations. Baikal, a popular tourist destination, may also have lost business because 
of decreased time spent vacationing away from home. Not only did respondents not have 
as many resources to invest, but there was also a decrease in “the percentage of persons 
who went on vacation” by 1.3 to 1.5 times.152 Instead of vacationing on Baikal at the 
Arshan hot springs or in the resort town of Lestvianka people were more likely to stay 
home, “working around the house or on their farm plot...making repairs; doing 
construction, and earning money on the side.”153 Respondents attributed not going on 
vacation to two main reasons: lack of money and the need to work around the home and 
yard.154 As previously mentioned, for many in the former Soviet states, financial 
struggles and the need to supplement former government programs came with the fall of 
the USSR. In this way, tourism on Baikal, which represents a source of revenue that 
does not pollute as much as factories or timber, likely suffered from the political 
changes. 
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 The economic hardships and coinciding shifts in the ways individuals spent their 
free time that came with the transition inhibited environmentalist activism both in the 
short and long term on Baikal. However, not all the changes that arose during the switch 
from Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin (President of the Russian Federation after the fall of 
the USSR) had negative implications for environmentalism in the Baikal region. With 
the fall of communism that had been a deterrent for collaboration with countries such as 
the United States and the opening of borders, foreign governments, organizations, and 
consultants flooded to Russia in hopes of shaping post-Soviet politics and culture.  
 
D) Open Policies and Open Borders: Evolving Environmentalism with a New 
International Community on Baikal  
 As previously mentioned, Gorbachev’s policies on openness welcomed greater 
international exchange, including for environmental issues concerning Lake Baikal. For 
example, in 1990 the Soviet government requested “the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to evaluate Lake Baikal and its 
watershed as a potential World Heritage Site,” a status that was achieved in 1996.155 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, foreign governments and organizations took 
advantage of the formative stage the Russian Federation was in and attempted to 
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influence the direction of the former communist state in their favor. Likewise, with the 
inauguration of new policies and the rise of new leaders, environmentalists from around 
the globe saw the opportunity to support sustainable development on Baikal.  
 One of the longest-standing and most influential development plans was titled 
“The Baikal Region in the 21st Century: A Model of Sustainable Development or 
Continued Degradation?” It exemplifies the international collaboration opportunities 
around Lake Baikal and the new spaces for environmentalism that arose within the new 
community. The Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences partnered with the US 
Center for Citizen Initiatives on a two-year project guided by the US based consulting 
group Davis Associates. The resulting report in 1992 gave a land use proposal for the 30 
million hectares of the Baikal watershed. The proposal also argued for Baikal “as a 
model for sustainable development based on agriculture, education, forestry, mining, 
science, and tourism.”156 Additionally, in bringing economic and ecological interests 
together, the proposal also called for the participation of local populations and asserted 
that it was democratization that provided people the “general opportunity to become 
involved in land use decisions.”157 Just as the participants in the creation of this report 
represented new opportunities for international collaboration to protect Baikal, the 
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content of it also illustrates the ideals of sustainable, environmentally conscious 
development as well as the focus of environmentalism at the time.  
 The reports presents the ideals of development on Baikal with a clear list of 
primary objectives. A few in particular highlight the stakeholders who should be 
included in the projects to protect Baikal. Objectives four and five highlight the 
importance of local cultures and people in the ecological movement and for the 
protection of traditional Russian life, whose destruction Valentin Rasputin lamented. 
The fourth demands that the cultural traditions and diversity of the region are preserved. 
Objective five is to “insure that present and future generations in the Lake Baikal basin 
can live in dignity and improved quality of life.”158 The sixth objective calls for the 
involvement of the “people of the Baikal watershed in policy decisions.”159 This 
objective addresses the problems which arose with centralized decision making 
regarding ecological issues that we discussed earlier. The people of Baikal must have a 
say and a way to make their opinion heard by the leaders in Moscow who have ultimate 
control of resources.  
 The objectives of the report also call for unprecedented international partnerships 
and greater intergovernmental agreements in protecting Baikal. Indeed, the Baikal water 
basin does not affect only Russia, but also the neighboring Mongolia. Objective seven 
calls for the expansion of cooperation between Russia and Mongolia “among all levels 
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of government within the basin.”160 Objective eight requires the participation of 
countries not directly connected to the Baikal water basin by calling for Baikal to 
“achieve UNESCO World Heritage site designation to reflect global significance of the 
Baikal region and the determination of Russian people to protect it.”161 As we know, in 
1996 Lake Baikal met the goal of this objective and became a UNESCO world heritage 
site.  
 The UNESCO World Heritage Site reinforces the focus of the objectives of the 
Davis report with its own requirements for receiving the World Heritage Site title. First, 
instead of the federal government making all of the decisions regarding Baikal, 
“regional committees and ecology...that can review the harm to the environment” would 
have primary responsibility for the protection of the lake.162 Second, it calls for 
expanded protected areas and international cooperation to create funding for future 
programs. Third, the Davis report appeals to the UNESCO World Heritage Site criteria 
by emphasizing a deep connection between the local peoples and the land and a 
“heightened respect for native peoples.” 163 
 The report encourages diverse public participation rather than top-down decision 
making from the federal government. It also offers steps that the government and people 
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of Russia needed to take to reach the goals set in the final proposal. In order to incite 
public participation, the report demands legislative action to form a Baikal Commission, 
to give all citizens the right to information regarding land use decisions and the ability to 
take legal action against the commission in the event that the commission has decided 
unjustly.  
 The objectives of the report set the standard for the political prerogatives for 
protection of the basin. Mainly, the second objective aims to “inextricably link 
sustainable economic development and environmental protection.”164 The third objective 
then offers a basic definition of environmental protection as that which is necessary to 
“preserve natural ecological processes and biological diversity.”165 
 The report suggests a funding strategy that would require local/regional and 
international buy-in on projects. These stipulations also reinforce the importance of 
protected land areas, such as the zapovednik. Under Davis’ recommendations, the 
regional administrations in each oblast’ would pledge support of environmental 
conservation efforts with monetary funds. The Russian Federation would then give 
funds for a system of national protected areas. Financial support for the national parks, 
natural reserves, wildlife refuges, and other protected lands would also come from taxes 
in the Russian Federation. The International Monetary Fund in coalition with the World 
Bank were charged with the task of updating the infrastructure in the region to make it 
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more environmentally friendly. The specific tasks included facilitating the process of 
industrial privatization, assisting efforts in making cellulose plants, specifically the one 
located in Baikalsk, and implemented modern communication systems, transportation, 
and sewage systems.166  
 Ecotourism also came to the forefront as a good source of revenue for the Baikal 
region as tourist sites could charge a tax on tourist rentals. The Davis report advised that 
the funds from ecotourism could support community redevelopment to improve the 
citizens’ quality of life. Ecotourism also provides additional career opportunities aside 
from industrial work with tourist agencies, museums, hot springs, resorts etc. Improving 
the quality of citizens’ lives through careers in ecotourism seemed ideal as it addressed 
factors that inhibited participation in environmentalist activities, while also working in a 
profession that actively supported a healthier environment. Davis also proposed that 
tourist taxes be used to support the expenses of operating a Baikal Commission and 
goskomekologia, regional ecological councils which would also work on the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund’s initiatives to develop regional infrastructure.  
 These ideals for environmentalism around Baikal exemplify the potential spaces 
available for environmentalism at the time. Meanwhile, another Davis organization 
provided opportunities for people to become involved in protecting Baikal. In 1992 
President George H. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement pledging American-
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Russian collaboration to protect Lake Baikal. This statement officially made the 
conservation of Baikal an official U.S policy. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) contracted George Davis’ non-profit Ecologically 
Sustainable Development, Inc. to develop several land use planning projects. The first of 
the land use plans was in the Okinsky Region, “which was selected because of its 
relative simplicity: the population is small, dominated by indigenous peoples, and the 
potential land use conflicts (primarily concerning gold mining and forest management) 
are relatively minor.”167 Russian, North American, and Buryat resource specialists 
worked together between 1993 and 1995 to create 19 separate resource maps, which 
then became part of the final plan in a Geographic Information System format. The 
planning team tried to incorporate local traditions and “help the community identify 
economic, social, environmental, and cultural goals” of the project.168 
 The capstone of the project was a Declaration for Traditional Integrated 
Development that basically amounted to an ethics and policy statement of the 
indigenous people of Baikal that encompassed the environmental and cultural aspects of 
their community that they wanted to preserve. The decree, commonly referred to as the 
‘Oka Declaration,’ reaffirmed the important role of local populations in environmental 
protection around Baikal. It also reinforced the connections between the preservation of 
traditions of indigenous people and of Russian culture and the protection of Baikal itself. 
                                                




During the transitional period, the voice of the Baikal community gained great attention 
with the international community, which in its own way countered some of the 
restrictions civilians had due to the ecological decision making structure. Specifically, 
international governments and NGOs gave monetary support to local protection efforts 
around Baikal. Even as the domestic funding opportunities became complicated by the 
bureaucratic decision making processes that frequently impeded the delivery of funds, 
environmental NGOs could turn to the international community for financial support. 
For example, USAID supported The Great Baikal Trail, a prominent environmental 
NGO in Irkutsk. 
 In the 1990s the trends in internationally supported structures for grass roots 
efforts to protect Baikal continued. In the mid-1990s USAID was developing an idea for 
a Bed and Breakfast on Baikal that would be part of a trail circumnavigating around 
Baikal. Unconnected with USAID, numerous hostels and bed-and-breakfast inns have 
appeared around Baikal. It was not until 1999, however, that the idea of the Great Baikal 
Trail was presented, first at international exhibitions and for the UNESCO World 
Heritage Sites representatives and then to representatives of the World Bank, the U.S. 
Forest Service, Greenpeace, and the heads of environmental agencies in the Irkutsk 
region and the Republic of Buryatia.169 The idea was met with enthusiasm and by 2000 
the environmental non-profit The Great Baikal Trail (GBT) was born. The Great Baikal 
                                                
169 "History." The Great Baikal Trail. Accessed January 23, 2013. 
http://www.greatbaikaltrail.org/en/history., 1.  
Korsgard 112 
Trail constructs trails around Lake Baikal during the summers, while also hosting 
educational events regarding Lake Baikal. For all of their initiatives, they attract 
international volunteers.  
 Aside from USAID and the Great Baikal Trail, other internationally welcoming 
environmental organizations emerged. All of these organizations offered a concrete 
structure for interested locals to become involved in environmentalist projects. For 
example, the Baikal Ecological Wave is a nonprofit NGO that frequently partners with 
the Great Baikal Trail. Likewise, Greenpeace arrived in Russia. Based in Moscow, 
Greenpeace has no office in Irkutsk; however, the notoriety of the organization makes 
issues related to Baikal more widely known.  Greenpeace has published articles in 
English and Russian on their website on issues pertaining to Baikal. While it is unlikely 
for someone unfamiliar with Baikal to visit the websites of the smaller NGOs based on 
Baikal, environmental activists from around the world look to Greenpeace for news on 
important environmental concerns. It was Greenpeace’s protest of the Baikalsk pulp and 
paper mill that originally ignited the debates that led to the factory’s closing (although 
the organization insists that they did not want the factory to close, but rather for it to 
improve its environmental standards).  
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Chapter Six: Vladimir Putin and Modern Environmentalism 
 
A) Transitioning From Y eltsin to Putin 
 Increased conglomeration of power marks the transition from Boris Yeltsin to 
Vladimir Putin in 2000. During his first years in office (1991-1995), Yeltsin hoped to 
make environmental concerns a permanent part of the government agenda with the 
Ministry of Ecology and Environmental Protection law. However, in 1996 the Ministry 
of Ecology was demoted, perhaps due to a lack of clear constituency and funding.170 An 
uncertain legal environment, sporadic environmental policymaking, and growing 
regional autonomy characterized his tenure in office. Unfortunately, Yeltsin’s time in 
power also saw economic collapse, which led to the disillusionment of many in the 
country. In 1999 Vladimir Putin emerged as Prime Minister and by 2000 he claimed the 
presidency.  
 In many ways the exact opposite of Yeltsin, Putin founded his power in strong 
economic policies. His push for economic growth, commended by many, included a 
distrust of environmentalism. Law’s enacted with Putin’s support exemplify the leader’s 
feelings towards environmentalism. A new law defining treason contains deliberate 
vagueness that allows the government “[to] brand any dissenter a traitor,” including 
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environmentalists.171  With this law, enacted in Fall 2012, “anyone possessing 
information deemed secret — whether a politician, a journalist, an environmentalist or 
an union leader” can face twenty years in prison for espionage.172 At the same time, he 
reined in independent oligarchs that had previously challenged federal authority, and 
made federal laws superior to regional ones. All of these factors made it difficult for 
activists to have their voices heard due to lack of regional power and control of local 
resources and the inability to use the court to oppose state policies.173 Under Putin, the 
economy did improve, but at the cost of plans for environmental sustainability, such as 
the one presented in the Davis report.  
 
B) Civic Activism and Opportunities for Environmentalism on Baikal  
 The examples of state repression of environmental activism on Baikal have a 
counter example. On August 26, 2010 Putin’s successor, Dmitri Medvedev, ordered the 
halt to construction of a logging project in the Khimki forest between St. Petersburg and 
Moscow. As the article “The New Activism in Russia” discusses, the Khimki protests 
succeeded “where other recent protests had failed,” including those against the Baikalsk 
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Paper and Pulp mill on Baikal.174 The success of the Khimki protests has also spurred 
debate on the power that non-governmental organizations and organizations have in 
influencing the government on environmental issues in modern Russia.  
 On one side, Yevgenia Chirikova, a thirty-three year old mother and 
environmentalist believes that with “hard work and persistence, ordinary people have the 
power to effect change even in the absence of a functioning democracy.”175 Those who 
agree with her would say that people of any age can easily rally around a forest, which is 
much more tangible than environmental laws. Additionally, the Khimki protests present 
the possibility that when enough people join the movement, they create a “critical mass” 
to which the government is obligated to respond. However, the failures of activists to 
force the government to enforce environmental regulations on the Baikalsk Pulp and 
Paper mill indicate that either the critical mass was not sufficient in that situation or that 
other factors play a part in the government’s ecological decisions. In short, civic 
activism fits into a larger power structure that cannot be ignored.  
 As in the United States, politicians in Russia make their decisions based on a 
variety of factors. After calculating the pros and cons, if a decision does not seem 
advantageous for their goals, then they will not do it even if it would be what many 
would consider the ethical decision. A decision may be politically advantageous for a 
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variety of reasons. For example, closing a factory that provides revenue and employment 
in a community could cause the politician to lose constituents. Nikolai Petrov argues that 
“civil society actions can succeed...only when they are able to ally with one elite group 
against another.” 176 He asserts that environmental activists will only see victories if they 
can gain an elite sponsor. Environmental groups can therefore monitor internal conflicts 
within the government and strategically leverage those tensions to their advantage. 
Petrov’s strategies offer hope to the environmental movement. When Putin raised the 
maximum emission rates from factories to reopen the polluting Baikalsk Paper and Pulp 
Mill it sent a clear message to non-governmental organizations, i.e., Greenpeace, 
working to find a mutually beneficial solution that the government has ultimate control 
and is not willing to compromise. With Petrov’s strategies in mind, however, it seems 
that these organizations do have windows to pressure the government to change. While 
finding an elite sponsor may not always be possible, environmental NGOs should 
dedicate more time utilizing political strategies to their advantage. 
 Non-governmental organizations, such as the Great Baikal Trail and the Baikal 
Wave, offer opportunities for environmentalist civic engagement. In many ways Putin’s 
policies restricted the opportunities for growth that such organizations had found in the 
early nineties. The persecution of scientists and journalists on issues of “national 
security” made independent research difficult. As we have outlined, previously scientists 
and writers were the most outspoken concerning Baikal. Likewise, Putin limited the 
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freedom of NGOs and international funding. In 2006 it became illegal for NGOs to have 
a bank account, making finances a logistical nightmare. Similarly, Putin scorns foreign 
government influence in Russia as it finances “‘political activity in the country.’” 177 
Evidence of the influence of Putin’s stance on foreign involvement in the country 
appears in the recent expulsion of USAID from Russia. Likewise, in 2006 a law was 
passed that monitors and restricts foreign support for NGOs.178 Moreover, because 
international funding had supplemented government funds in the early 1990s in the 
Baikal region, the restriction on foreign assistance combined with limited federal 
support inhibits the possibilities for expansion of already small environmental groups.  
 The previously mentioned article “The New Civic Activism in Russia” also 
presents the idea that the lack of activism may not just be due to state repression. Indeed, 
the article hypothesizes that “many citizens have also become alienated from traditional 
civil society players such as NGOs, which they feel do not reflect their values and 
everyday experience.”179 While the resistance to international involvement may come 
from the people to some extent, the government encourages these sentiments. The 
relative popularity of environmental non-governmental organizations with international 
connections in Irkutsk indicates that this assertion may not be completely accurate for 
the Baikal region. A survey that I conducted last year in Irkutsk provides insight into the 
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level of participation and the reasons individuals do and do not get involved in 
movements to protect Baikal.  
 
C) The Voice of Local Residents: A  Survey on Involvement in Environmental 
Movements 
 CI) Methodology and Potential Weaknesses of the Survey 
 
 While studying abroad in Irkutsk with the School of Russian and Asian Studies, I 
completed an independent research project on the perception of environmentalism in the 
Baikal region. The survey consisted of eleven questions: eight multiple choice, and three 
free response. The questions were geared to discover the following: 1) How frequently 
those living in the region participate in environmental activism on average, 2) Their 
perception of common impacts of environmental degradation and 3) How prepared the 
individual is to work for the protection of the environment of Baikal. Here we will focus 
on the responses to three of these questions (see figures 1, 2, and 3) that specifically 
address citizen participation in environmental NGOs and environmental protection 
rallies and events. 
 I distributed paper copies of the survey in addition to distributing the survey 
online with Surveymonkey.com as a platform and Facebook.com, Vkontakte.ru (a 
Russian equivalent of Facebook), and CouchSurfing.org as distribution methods. The 
online version received 71 responses between March 20th and April 4th. I handed out 
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approximately 70 additional paper copies throughout Irkutsk, mostly at the Irkutsk State 
Linguistic University and the Irkutsk State University. Because the main locales for 
distribution were universities, the majority of the respondents were students between the 
ages of 18 and 22. Likewise, because most of my acquaintances in Russia are around my 
age (21), most respondents on Facebook, Vkontakte, and CouchSurfing were also in 
their late teens to mid-twenties. I gave the survey to individuals at bars and cafes, to 
guests of the host family, and to high-school aged students of the English language. 
Again, the respondents at cafes and bars were mostly students, although some older 
individuals from my host family responded to the survey as well.  
 The limited diversity, particularly in age and education level, of respondents is 
important to keep in mind when analyzing the findings, but it does not make the results 
invalid. Indeed, in retrospect it may have been better to have explicitly distributed the 
survey to students. This age-bracket is the most disposed to partake in civic activism 
because students generally do not have the burden of taking care of a family or working. 
Many students, including my classmates at Irkutsk State Linguistic University, even 
seek out opportunities to volunteer with NGOs to gain experience and to bolster their 
resumes. Students, therefore, represent a key group for environmental NGOs to target 
when soliciting support.  
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CII) Results and Analysis  
 
 In this survey, 89.7% of respondents reported that they feel that climate change 
is a threat (figure 1). However, only 39.7% of respondents reported having participated 
in an organization working to protect Baikal or in environmental protection events, i.e., 
rallies, educational activities, awareness days, etc (figure 2).180  
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Figure 2. Percentage of those Having Participated in Environmental Initiatives or 
Events 
 
 That said, 82.3% of respondents to that same survey reported that they feel 
prepared to participate in the environmental movement; however, 39.7% reported that 
they felt ready but did not know how to be involved (figure 3).181 From that perspective, 
increased visibility for and accessibility to environmental movements might help 
galvanize support for them. For example, in 2012 the Great Baikal Trail was located in 
an obscure part of Irkutsk and most first-time visitors to the group got lost. Unable to 
find the NGO’s office, it is probable that many potential participants were deterred from 
becoming involved. On a different note, the public transportation of the city is 
frequently crowded and difficult to navigate, particularly if you are elderly or not as 
mobile because there are no handicap accessible buses. If a person with limited mobility 
wanted to get involved in an environmental organization they would need access to a 
car. The environmental organizations do not have the power to do an overhaul on the 
                                                
181 Korsgard, “Baikal in Space and Place,” 12.  
Korsgard 122 
entire infrastructure of the city; however, by holding events in a variety of places 
throughout the city they may reach audiences who were unable to participate previously 
because of the distance. Likewise, by choosing a more central office location they both 
will increase their visibility and make themselves more accessible to the people of 
Irkutsk. Since I completed this survey in Spring of 2012, The Great Baikal Trail has 
relocated to a more central location. It will be interesting to see how this location change 
will affect their participation levels. 
Figure 3. Level of Preparedness to Participate in Environmentalism 
Events/Groups
 
 Despite factors deterring environmental activism, environmental organizations 
continue to exist and many of them invite international participants. Furthermore, an 
international environmentalist community continues to support efforts to save Lake 
Baikal; however, it must also uncover and capitalize on other resources for financial 
sustainability and to draw in more participants from Russia as well as from abroad. 
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Similarly, environmental activists for Baikal should weigh the political advantages of 





  The circumstances for modern environmentalist movements have been shaped 
by the culture and politics of the past century. In this paper we have traced the evolution 
of environmentalism on Baikal from the 1930s through present day with an emphasis on 
the periods of political and economic transition. Particularly, in the twentieth century 
Russia faced significant political and economic turmoil as the country passed through 
various forms of governance: Tsarism, a communist state, a federal presidential republic. 
As we have seen, periods of transition at times offered new opportunities for 
environmentalist action. At other times, the new political climate limited activism to 
protect the Sacred Sea.  
 Based on my analysis of the texts and resources in this paper, I conclude that 
Stalin’s repressive rule set the stage for the exploitation of Baikal’s resources in the 
name of industrialization and economic development. The reforms of Stalin’s successor, 
Khrushchev, led to greater freedom of speech, which resulted in public outspokenness 
about the degradation of the lake. During the Khrushchev Thaw, however, the 
environmentalist movement was still confined by the push for industrialization started 
under Stalin. Finally, the transition leading up to and following the fall of the USSR 
created a space for environmentalist movements around Baikal within an international 
community; at the same time, these movements faced real challenges due to a lack of 
domestic funding and regulation of environmental policies. 
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 While Baikal’s beauty and biodiversity are exceptional, the lessons learned in the 
fight to protect the lake can serve other movements as well. The contextualization within 
the politics, economy, and culture of the times discussed in this work reveals the 
potential opportunities and challenges for civic activists today in Russia and around the 
world. First, broader cultural, social, political, and economic barriers limit 
environmentalist movements, although the specifics of these barriers vary depending on 
the country or region. Factors inhibiting environmental protection may include national 
political repression that impedes the movement’s freedom to protest as well as local 
infrastructural issues that impact individuals’ ability to access environmental 
organizations. Second, potential opportunities for international support and collaboration 
will increase as the distance between countries closes with improved communication 
technologies and globalization. There are few places left untouched by the flow of 
culture and information through the Internet. Online mediums such as social networks or 
blogs can prove useful in raising international awareness for regional environmental 
threats. As we saw with the movement to protect Baikal, activists should seek out niches 
within an international community. With continued globalization an international 
perspective will become increasingly important as countries work together to solve 
environmental crises, such as global climate change. 
 Lastly, while this work deals with environmentalism, the factors outlined above 
that inform the opportunities and limitations to activism apply to other causes. With a 
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contextualization within political and social circumstances, civic activists can better 
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